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Illegal money lending & debt project Consumer Council
Before the initiation of the project, 
the following research aims were identified: 
• Conduct a comprehensive literature review of all the existing 
research and policies relating to illegal money lending.
• Explore in depth the views and experiences of practitioners 
and professionals working in the area of citizen advocacy 
with respect to money lending (both legitimate and 
illegitimate) and debt.
• Identify the scale and scope of the problem (processes 
and nature of the problem as well as its geography and 
consequences for communities).
• Identify those most at risk (including the demographics of 
those most at risk).
• Identify social demographic trends that contribute to this 
problem.
• Provide an overview of the types of individuals and 
organisations involved (as well as the rationale for their 
involvement).
• Assess the current levels of support and service provision 
required to counter this problem.
• Focus in particular on the experiences and needs of 
vulnerable consumers.
Introduction Executive Summary
The primary objective of this project was to explore 
the nature and extent of illegal money lending and 
problematic debt in Northern Ireland and place these 
findings in the context of knowledge and experiences 
gained in other parts of the UK and further afield.
This final report examines each of these and, in order to facilitate 
maximisation of impact, it also highlights numerous examples of 
good practice and recommendations for further consideration. 
Many issues discussed in this report also have wider implications 
beyond this jurisdiction, and it is hoped that relevant stakeholders 
and scholars in other parts of the world will find it useful.
In relation to the methodology, a major component of the 
work involved a desktop analysis (literature survey) of relevant 
national and international legislation, reports published by 
governmental and non-governmental organisations, and 
national/international cases, as well as academic literature on 
the subject. This desktop work was significantly supplemented 
by a series of semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, 
together with a focus group looking into the services they 
provide, and the challenges they face in deploying them, 
set against their knowledge on the scale and severity of this 
issue. The research team was granted unprecedented access 
to a range of law enforcement agencies, citizen advocacy 
organisations and civil society groups across the jurisdiction.
The research team is extremely grateful to everyone who kindly 
offered their time to be interviewed. In particular, the research 
team would like to express its gratitude to The Consumer Council 
for its support and guidance throughout the research cycle. 
Background  
1. Illegal money lending is not a uniquely modern 
phenomenon; it has been an intrinsic aspect of many 
working-class communities for generations. It has become 
a sociocultural pillar for many people on low incomes 
as a normalised means of accessing additional and 
alternative forms of credit. Sean O’Connell shows how, 
in the post-war era, efforts shifted from helping people to 
avoid entering into debt to the need to regulate debt. The 
perception of debt may also have changed. Where once 
concerns arose at the point of entering a contract, ‘debt’ is 
now only recognised once problems with repayment make 
it an urgent concern. In general, debt advisers are only 
engaged after this point has been reached. 
2. The Illegal Money Lending Teams established in England, 
Scotland and Wales (but not Northern Ireland) in 2004 
estimate that there are around 310,000 households in 
the UK (excluding Northern Ireland) that are in debt to an 
‘illegal lender’. A survey conducted in 2017 by the Illegal 
Money Lending Team in England found that borrowers 
were in all genders and age groups. Some 70% lived in 
rented accommodation, 58% were claiming benefits and 
19% had visited food banks in the previous year. The 
research found that 36% of those who borrowed from a 
‘loan shark’ were unemployed, 23% were employed full-
time, 20% were self-employed, 15% employed part-time, 
3% were retired and 2% were students; in addition, 50% 
were parents. 
3. The survey also found that illegal money lending has a 
strong association with distress and stress. Three quarters 
said they were in a state of ‘worry’ or ‘distress’ as a result 
of loan sharks. Almost half reported a long-term health 
condition (including 12% who said they had mental health 
issues) and almost a third said they had considered taking 
their own life at some point. In addition, 43% said they had 
been abused verbally, threatened or physically harmed as 
a result of going to a loan shark. 
The core research team consisted of Dr Brian Payne (Principal Investigator), 
Dr Conor Murray, Professor Duncan Morrow and Dr Jonny Byrne. The project 
was assisted by a range of public agencies and community and voluntary 
organisations across the jurisdiction. They provided advice on the direction of the 
project, took part in a focus group and gave in-depth semi-structured interviews.
Debt and indebtedness in the UK as a whole and 
in Northern Ireland 
4. Since 2008, there has been an increase in the number 
of people in the UK ‘at risk’ of living in poverty, a rise 
in insecure and low-paid employment, an increase in 
levels of negative equity, a fall in ‘real’ wage levels, and 
a culture of limited public support for those in financial 
distress. In 2016, an estimated 8.3 million people in the 
UK had ‘problem debts’. Some 16% of the population in 
Northern Ireland, and 19% of children, live in poverty. 
Although the number of people in work rose by 16,000 
over the first quarter of 2019, more than half of those who 
are unemployed in Northern Ireland (56%) are long-term 
unemployed. This can be contrasted with the figure for the 
UK as a whole, which stands at 26%. Northern Ireland 
also has the lowest discretionary income of any UK region. 
5. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) data in relation to debt for 
2008/2009 found that the UK had a higher than average 
debt-to-income ratio – 171% of disposable household 
income in 2009 (mortgages accounted for 133% of this 
figure). By comparison, the household debt-to-income 
ratio in France and Germany is lower: in France, the figure 
is 107%, with mortgages accounting for 77% of this; and 
in Germany, the figure is 99%, with 67% accounted for 
by mortgages. The vulnerability of households to acute 
and unforeseen problems with debt is inevitably also 
considerable. 
6. In a report assessing the ‘financial health’ of households, 
Legal and General (2012) found that the average citizen 
in the UK has only enough savings to last for 19 days in 
the event of a financial crisis or emergency. In 2016, four 
out of ten UK residents had less than the equivalent of one 
week’s wages saved. Northern Ireland is the UK region 
with the lowest proportion of citizens with savings of more 
than £100.
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Illegal money lending in the UK 
as a whole and in Northern Ireland 
1. The short-term high-interest loan, or sub-prime sector, 
has expanded in recent years in the UK and the Republic 
of Ireland. In the UK, ‘the market of ‘high cost short-term 
credit’ grew from £300 million in 2006 to £2.5 billion 
in 2013 (a growth rate of more than 700%), decreasing 
to £1.5 billion by mid-2016’. Paying bills and providing 
for daily living expenses are the two most-cited reasons 
for requiring a sub-prime loan, which is contrary to the 
typical stereotype of the ‘reckless’ consumer who gets into 
financial difficulty by purchasing luxury items. 
2. In the UK, ‘illegal money lending’ is defined as ‘lending 
without a consumer credit license as required by the Office 
of Fair Trading under the terms of the Consumer Credit Act’ 
1974 (See NICVA, 2013, p.8 for a broader description). 
The term is used imprecisely and is often conflated with 
associated terms such as ‘usury’, ‘loan sharking’, and 
‘illegal borrowing’. Anecdotal and case-study evidence 
continues to highlight the impact, if not necessarily the 
scale, of the practice in Northern Ireland. Two cases 
of ‘illegal loan sharking’ were referred to the Trading 
Standards Service in Northern Ireland between 2004 
and 2013. 
3. Illegal money lending has principally been prosecuted 
under two acts – the Consumer Credit Act 1974 and 
the often concomitantly applied Proceeds of Crime Act 
2002. There is some geographical inconsistency within 
the UK regarding certain provisions of the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002. In 2011, the Scottish government made 
amendments to the lifestyle offences section (schedule 4) 
of the Act. Following R v Greaves (2011), a person cannot 
be punished twice for what is the same offence. 
4. Illegal money lending flourishes in the gap between 
market demand for credit and the available legal supply 
especially if, as on a small number of occasions, illegal 
lenders offer more competitive rates of APR than their legal 
short-term loan competitors. The Office of Fair Trading 
(2010) found that almost 30% of loans in the UK were not 
repaid on the initial repayment date, while the Irish League 
of Credit Unions found that 43% of clients who took out 
‘payday’ loans could not afford to make their repayments, 
resulting in a lower credit rating. Seidl (1968) suggested 
that secrecy, informality, speed of access and availability 
are the keys to illegal money lending. 
5. The interest rates associated with short-term payday loans 
are very high. There is persistent evidence that debt can 
quickly escalate out of control once payment deadlines are 
missed. Many borrowers are repeat customers, some of 
whom are taking out new loans in an attempt to pay off old 
ones. But despite the difficulties, high-cost sub-prime and 
payday loans remain in demand, potentially increasing 
the risk that borrowers enter a spiral of high-interest debt. 
While stricter regulation on payday loans since 2014 
Respondents identified lender approaches 
to interest rates as a key factor in defining 
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of lending and 
were especially concerned with high or even 
extortionate rates, lenders operating without 
an interest rate cap, or being able to change 
terms and conditions, including interest rates, 
during a loan period.
Some respondents described illegal lending as being more 
prevalent in working-class districts where organisations 
could ensure compliance with the terms of a loan, including 
coercive measures such as violence and intimidation. From 
this perspective, the history of violent conflict and the ways in 
which it has defined relationships has left a distinctive legacy in 
Northern Ireland that cannot be compared simply with the rest 
of the UK.
It was suggested by some respondents that there was ‘a culture 
of borrowing within Northern Ireland as a whole’ (Focus 
Group). This belief is supported by some of the findings from the 
literature review. Some respondents described money lending 
as being like an addiction or dependency where illegal lenders 
were viewed by residents as an integral part of the community, 
providing a worthy and necessary service to community 
members. Some suggested that members of some communities 
have been utilising the same illegal lending for generations, 
with the durability of these lenders based upon the personal 
relationships that are established between the lender and the 
borrower ‘on the doorstep’ in working-class communities.
appears to have reduced the number of such loans, 
concerns have been raised that the demand for short-term 
credit could push some people towards loan sharks and 
illegal forms of credit. 
6. There is no single reason why a person may use an ‘illegal 
money lender’. Among the most important reasons are that 
borrowers have exhausted all available resources and 
have a desperate and urgent need for money, often being 
tipped into using the service by a crisis or unexpected 
particular shortfall in income, that lending has been 
habitual and prevalent in communities for generations, and 
that there is a strong correlation between areas of high 
economic deprivation (particularly in social and rented 
housing estates) and the volume of illegal money lending 
(Financial Conduct Authority, 2017). 
Organised crime, paramilitarism 
and illegal money lending 
7. Across Europe, there is a lack of reliable quantitative data 
and research on illegal money lending and ‘loan sharking’, 
primarily as a result of the criminal nature of the activity. 
This is associated with a reluctance among victims to come 
forward to ‘tell their story’, which makes it difficult for 
researchers to work with confidence. 
8. The potential for intimidation and reluctance to engage 
are, however, obvious in Northern Ireland. That said, 
the limited quantitative evidence base tends to rely on 
anecdotal ‘stories’ and information gleaned from larger 
pieces of work whose main aim is to assess the issues 
of credit and debt more generally. Qualitative research 
consistently highlights both victim fear and distress and 
explicit threats being made to debtors upon their inability 
to maintain repayments on loans taken out at extortionate 
rates, when they are in most financial need. 
9. Two aspects appear to be evident: on the one hand, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that, in some areas, loyalist 
and republican paramilitary organisations practice loan 
sharking as a means of generating extra revenue and 
maintaining social control over specific neighbourhoods; 
at the same time, research also suggests that illegal money 
lending is not limited to organised criminal gangs. One 
study suggests that many illegal payments were collected 
by lenders themselves, and involved smaller groups of 
individuals (and family members) relying on informal social 
networks rather than the more impersonal and hierarchical 
structure of organised and larger criminal enterprises that 
involve dealing with ‘strangers’. 
10. Illegal money lending is a phenomenon in communities in 
Northern Ireland and is therefore inevitably tied up with 
the illegal structures operating in communities. However, 
an important factor when considering why illegal 
money lending is so pervasive is that it is experienced as 
unremarkable. It is much less certain that the paramilitaries 
monopolise illegal money lending nor that money lending 
is the sole, or even the preferred, form of extortion.
Research Findings
Our research found an interchangeable, and not always consistent, use of terms 
such as ‘illegal money lending’, ‘loan sharking’ and ‘unauthorised lending’. 
Respondents appeared less concerned by precise terms than with a distinction 
between formal (regulated) lending and informal (unregulated) lending, 
described as unregistered lending from one person to another outside of the 
controls of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). While other forms of doorstep 
lending fell outside this definition of illegal activity, any high-interest lending was 
described by many participants as a major issue.
Many respondents categorised those involved in illegal money 
lending in two broad groups: paramilitaries and ‘regular’ 
members of the community. However, there was no evidently 
uniform pattern of personality, affiliation or legitimacy.
In particular, the research did not find evidence of one or more 
group appearing to orchestrate illegal money lending as has 
been the case elsewhere. Rather it appeared to be distributed 
widely, taking a variety of forms.  
However, respondents agreed that all money lenders in 
Northern Ireland must have some form of local influence or 
legitimacy, which may stem from a paramilitary connection, 
but must have the ability to carry out enforcement measures in 
order to settle or recoup the debt, including coercing debtors to 
facilitate criminal activity.
In practice, it appears to be increasingly difficult to distinguish 
paramilitarism from the broader illegal economy with any 
consistency. Because of their historic organisation in some 
areas, many believed that paramilitary groups were certainly 
aware of, though not necessarily directly organising, lending. 
In many instances, paramilitary ‘influence’ was inferred through 
an indirect form of affiliation or assigned authority.
However, it was also frequently argued that the involvement 
of paramilitaries was much more indirect or ambiguous, with 
Illegal money lending often being carried out directly by well-
known community members operating without any internal 
organisational control.
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Several of those interviewed suggested that illegal lending was 
also taking place within minority ethnic, including Chinese and 
Eastern European, communities, where it may be associated 
with gangs engaged in unregulated gambling, immigration 
offences including human trafficking, and the drugs trade.
Those working in law enforcement and citizen advocacy 
fields frequently reported either a lack of evidence or highly 
varied accounts of its prevalence. Almost every interviewee 
referenced the hidden nature of illegal money lending. When 
pressed, respondents agreed that the two most important 
factors contributing to the hidden nature of illegal lending were 
fear and shame. Advocacy groups, community organisations 
and law enforcement agencies have had to become adept at 
spotting both the symptoms and the vulnerabilities that may 
indicate that members of the public have a problem.
Many noted that there continues to be a reluctance within many 
communities in Northern Ireland to speak to the authorities 
due to fears that any individual doing so could be labelled an 
informer and invite reprisals.
Many actively involved in advising members of the public 
speculated that their clients may be hiding the true source of 
their debt due to embarrassment. However, vague or untrue 
information ensures that advisors are unable to negotiate 
with lenders to secure a freeze in charges and interest or to 
negotiate a more realistic repayment schedule. Finding ways to 
encourage people with these issues to open up is therefore vital 
for progress.
For many of those interviewed, the reasons that people 
borrowed from illegal lenders were related to key 
vulnerabilities, including poverty-related issues. The problem 
has been exacerbated in recent times by changes to the 
benefits system and prolonged austerity. Several respondents 
described a situation where the areas they service have 
become increasingly deprived, with a lack of well-paid work 
ensuring that people have become dependent on lending to 
supplement their household incomes.
Universal Credit was repeatedly identified as a driver for illegal 
lending, with the changeover from the previous benefits system 
of Income Support frequently creating problems for members 
of the public. In particular, citizen advocacy groups spoke 
frequently about the harm caused by the four-to five-week 
waiting times and issues with short-term benefits loans that were 
then repaid from future benefits, ensuring that benefit claimants 
were always short of the funds they needed to support their 
household, obliging them to look to other means of getting 
money.
Several of those interviewed related evidence of a coercive 
power dynamic between lender and borrower including the 
use of violence or intimidation, and signs of overt poverty due 
to an inability to purchase goods and utilities or the pawning or 
seizure of possessions.
Respondents highlighted the close connection between illegal 
loans and retribution for non-payment. The threat of retribution 
for non-payment seemed to be regarded as a separate entity in 
the community. The enforcement mechanisms or retributions for 
non-repayment were often arbitrary and subjective. However, 
in many instances, from the community perspective, violent 
retribution seemed to be an acceptable part of the illegal 
money lending process, likely to affect certain borrowers.
In many communities, there appears to be a consensus that 
violent punishment is acceptable for young men, but not for 
others. For young men, violent repercussions are common. 
Repercussions for other debtors have centred around some 
degree of shaming. In the case of women or elderly people, 
lenders can turn up at places of work, or wait for them at the 
Post Office on the day that benefits are received, or even take 
possession and have control of Post Office cards.
In some cases, lenders may make exceptions for people 
who are in abject poverty. Stories of this nature circulating 
in communities may reinforce community support for illegal 
lenders. However, other respondents noted that illegal lenders 
saw it as imperative that they pursue whoever they can to 
recoup debts, to avoid being seen as weak.
Mental health was raised repeatedly by respondents keen 
to make the connection between illegal money lending and 
a range of problems including stress, well-being, and even 
suicide.
While there was a consensus that tackling illegal money lending 
has been low on the Police Service of Northern Ireland’s (PSNI) 
list of priorities, some respondents understood that the police’s 
priority was to tackle paramilitarism as a whole. In this view, the 
priority was to close down paramilitaries in all their activities, 
not just focusing on money lending, which is smaller in scale.
Some participants underlined the secretive nature of illegal 
money lending. Because of both the initial stigma surrounding 
being in debt and fear of reprisal from the lender, who may 
have connections to paramilitary organisations, participants 
only come to the police as a last resort. This is consistent with the 
fact that only two cases of illegal money lending were referred 
to the Trading Standards Service in Northern Ireland between 
2004 and 2013.
Critics contend, however, that a purely policing approach to 
tackling loan sharking dilutes the social policy dimensions of 
the effort to combat illegal money lending. In addition, there is 
evidence of a desire in many communities in Northern Ireland 
to reassess the labelling of illegal activity in communities away 
from the simple view that all crime is in some way paramilitary. 
While a Paramilitary Crime Task Force might make a difference 
to illegal money lending in some areas, it is unlikely to eliminate 
either debt or illegal money lending in general; it would also 
compound the risk that, by focusing exclusively on paramilitary 
involvement, addressing illegal money lending is targeted only 
on communities with an overt paramilitary presence.
There was a shared belief that the principal reasons behind 
people getting into debt were (a) a lack of knowledge and 
understanding regarding the alternative sources of finance 
available to them, and (b) a lack of knowledge on how to 
manage money effectively. Many of the respondents felt 
that these knowledge deficits could be addressed by more 
financial education from a young age.
In this research, Credit Unions received broad support as 
potential sources for alternative finance. It was also felt that 
Northern Ireland is lagging behind Scotland in developing 
programmes on financial exclusion. Institutions such as the 
Credit Union, Scotcash or Fair for You were seen to have had 
consistent success in providing alternative financial solutions 
to borrowers. However, there still appears to be a lack of 
awareness among borrowers of their existence and the 
benefits they offer. One possibility was that banks could take 
up the business of payday loan companies if they increase 
their appetite for risk, thus addressing one of the key reasons 
why people have to resort to illegal lenders. Respondents 
were also clear that a government scheme to remove or 
underwrite some of the risk to lenders, to enable them to offer 
loans to a broader range of customers, including those with 
poor credit ratings, would be beneficial.
Some participants felt that The Consumer Council could be 
more involved in delivering education within communities 
and could do more to promote its services. While referencing 
the work done in leading attempts to coordinate forums for 
bringing stakeholders together to discuss problems around 
debt and problematic lending, many felt that part of the 
problem in this regard was a lack of cohesiveness between all 
of the organisations working towards supporting those in debt.
The research provided further insight into the wider 
sociocultural and economic context of borrowing from illegal 
money lenders. Although based on the obvious lack of access 
to alternative forms of mainstream credit, community illegal 
money lending may often be based on trust, ease, routine, 
and personal relationships ‘on the doorstep’ in working-class 
communities. Change will require a more formal focus on 
education and on alternatives, providing communities with an 
insight into the dangers of illegal lending and debt accrual, 
providing the knowledge and understanding of how to access 
alternative forms of finance.
Given the community-centric and cultural nature of illegal 
money lending within Northern Ireland operating within close-
knit working-class communities, many of the respondents felt 
that it was imperative that there was more of an educational 
approach – with a particular focus on children – in tackling 
the issue. It was acknowledged that there are some examples 
of good practice, notably The Consumer Council-led 
Stakeholder Forum and the work in assisting prisoners; 
however, these projects were often regarded as independent, 
and it was strongly believed that the effective resourcing of 
a more ‘joined-up’ approach was necessary to ensure that 
similar services can be allocated to remove the conditions for 
illegal money lending and assist a broad range of citizens at 
risk from this problem.
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1. Law enforcement and prevention
A working group should be established between the main agencies with a stake in policing 
and prevention of illegal money lending in Northern Ireland, including The Consumer Council, 
PSNI, local councils, Trading Standards, Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC) and the 
National Crime Agency. The working group would:
• Consider the findings of this scoping exercise and other relevant research, as well as identify 
emerging gaps and issues.
• Agree practical inter-agency operational responses to illegal money lending and consider 
the relevance of good practice from other jurisdictions.
• Establish a coordinated approach to illegal money lending in Northern Ireland including 
enhanced support for victims, comprehensive advice and education in communities and 
appropriate support for all those affected by debt and its consequences.
2. Financial educational approach and inter-agency forum
The evidence from this research suggests that there are opportunities for a more formal and 
rigorous focus on the educational aspects of prevention. Such an approach would provide 
communities, and specifically those most vulnerable, with a greater insight into the dangers of 
illegal lending and debt accrual, and would enhance knowledge and understanding of how to 
access alternative forms of finance.
In supporting this work, it is recommended that The Consumer Council establish an inter-
agency ‘Education Forum’ that champions and effectively resources a ‘joined-up’ community 
development approach. Building on existing good practice, the forum would be led by 
organisations with the most experience in responding to this challenge, including The Consumer 
Council, Christians Against Poverty and Advice NI, but would also encourage participants from 
a broad spectrum of organisations – including those from the citizen advocacy, community, 
voluntary, housing, rehabilitation and education sectors – to ensure that the widest possible 
range of citizens at risk from illegal money lending are able to access education and support.
3. Realistic alternatives to illegal money lending
Government should urgently explore the potential to develop viable alternatives to illegal 
money lending, which should be accessible in a prompt manner without protracted 
administrative burdens being placed on the borrower.
Building on the evidence from this research, this could involve establishing a scheme that 
removes or underwrites some of the risk to participating lenders, enabling them to offer less 
onerous loans to a broader range of customers, including those with poor credit ratings.
The charging of extortionate rates of interest on money 
borrowed, a practice referred to as usury, is ‘almost as old 
as civilisation itself’ (Malcolm and Curtin, 1968, p.767). 
Alongside biblical injunctions prohibiting the charging 
of interest upon a loan (Goldstock and Coenen, 1980), 
1Thomas Aquinas argued that the practice was ‘immoral’ 
and akin to selling someone a bottle of wine twice – once 
for the purchase itself, and additionally for the pleasure of 
drinking it (Aquinas, 1918).
Malcom and Curtin (1968, p.767) refer to two basic 
elements involved in loan sharking in a criminal justice 
sense: firstly, ‘the lending of money at extortionate rates of 
interest’; and secondly, ‘the collection of the money with 
interest via the non-legal means of murder, threat, blackmail, 
assault, fear, defamation of character’. Throughout the 
twentieth century, organised criminal gangs involved more 
generally in extortion and racketeering began to expand 
upon their ‘business model’ to incorporate the very lucrative 
enterprise of loan sharking – from the ‘Peaky Blinder’ and 
‘Scuttler’ gangs in northern England (Davies, 1999) to 
the ‘Cosa Nostra’ of Sicily and the USA (Europol, 2013). 
Indeed, so endemic had the practice become by the mid-
twentieth century in the United States that the challenging of 
such practices was a foundation of the 1968 presidential 
campaign of Richard Nixon (Seidl, 1968).
Yet, more than 50 years later, the practices of loan sharking 
and illegal money lending remain problematic, not just for 
the victims and the authorities in the United States, but in 
all contexts, as various criminal enterprises continue to be 
involved in such practices. This includes the sarakin 2 lenders 
or the Yakuza organisation in Japan (Sterngold, 1993), 
‘Snakehead’ gangs in China and Hong Kong (Wang 
and Antonopolous, 2015; Cheng, 2018), and the Italian 
‘Ndrangheta organisation, which in 2013 allegedly 
had an income of £44 billion, surpassing the combined 
turnover of McDonald’s and Deutsche Bank (Europol, 2013; 
Guardian, 2014). 
Recommendations 1. Literature and Policy Review
3In the UK and the Republic of Ireland, criminal gangs are 
alleged to remain involved in the practice (MacNamee, 2014), 
with Illegal Money Lending Teams having been established in 
England, Scotland and Wales in 2004 to tackle it. These teams 
bring a multi-agency approach to loan sharking, with members 
including seconded police officers, financial investigators, victim 
support services and intelligence and phone forensic experts.
There are two key purposes to the Illegal Money Lending 
Teams in England, Scotland and Wales:
1. 1. They conduct enforcement actions to remove loan sharks 
from communities (the investigative arm); and
2. 2. They support the victims of loan sharks in terms of 
accessing debt advice and trying to improve their credit 
rating to ultimately access affordable, and legal, credit (the 
financial/victim support arm) (see NISRA, 2013, p.14).
In Northern Ireland, it is alleged that some loyalist and 
republican paramilitary organisations continue to practice 
loan sharking in the ‘Peace Process’ era as a means of 
generating extra revenue and helping to maintain power 
and social control over specific working-class Protestant 
or Catholic areas (NICVA, 2013, pp.8–10; Savona and 
Michele, 2015; NCA, 2018). 
Given the longevity of the criminal enterprise of illegal money 
lending or loan sharking in various contexts across time and 
space, it is perhaps pertinent to consider two key questions. 
Firstly, who are those most vulnerable to falling victim to it? 
Secondly, given the unsavoury and intimidatory nature of the 
practice, why does it endure? The purpose of this literature 
review is to consider both questions (and more) in a particularly 
Northern Irish context. In order to do so, it is necessary to first 
consider the ways in which the terms ‘illegal money lending’, 
‘usury’ 4 and ‘loan sharking’ are used, and second, to place the 
practices in the wider socio-economic and cultural contexts in 
which they occur.
1.1 Understanding illegal money lending
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1.1.1 Definitions of key terms
‘One of the factors complicating the analysis of illegal 
lending is the lack of univocal terminology. The terms usury,  
loan sharking, illegal and informal lending are often used 
synonymously and in reference to very different practices and 
socio-economic environments’ (Marinaro, 2017, p.202).
In Northern Ireland, the definition that tends to be used is 
‘illegal lending’, which was defined as ‘lending without a 
consumer credit license as required by the Office of Fair 
Trading under the terms of the Consumer Credit Act’ 1974 (See 
also NICVA, 2013, p.8). It is important to note that, from 1 
April 2014, the Financial Conduct Authority has taken over the 
responsibilities of the Office of Fair Trading. The 1974 definition 
is now quite dated and has been superseded on the statute 
book by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, as 
amended by the by the Bank of England and Financial Services 
Act 2016, which defines illegal money lending as:
‘carrying on a regulated activity within article 60B of the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated 
Activities) Order 2001 (S.I. 2001/544) (regulated 
credit agreements) in circumstances which constitute an 
authorisation offence’ (s.29)
While the term illegal money lending is a multifaceted term that 
can be interpreted in a straightforward linear manner, it is often 
very imprecise, especially when it is conflated with associated 
terms such as ‘usury’, ‘loan sharking’, and ‘illegal borrowing’. 
Ironically, the difficulty of accurately and universally defining 
illegal money lending was exemplified by a 2017 report by the 
FCA entitled Shining a light on illegal money lending: Consumer 
experiences of unauthorised lending in the UK (FCA, 2017, 
p.1). In utilising both illegal money lending and ‘unauthorised 
lending’ interchangeably in its title, the FCA risked conflating 
terms that were once distinct, resulting in the dilution of specific 
meanings. Indeed, within the report, ‘unauthorised lending’ is 
defined as commensurate with illegal money lending:
Unauthorised lending, often referred to as illegal money 
lending (IML), is the practice of lending money to individuals 
without regard to the rules and requirements of the 
regulatory framework (FCA, 2017, p.1).
Likewise, analysis of the use of the term ‘illegal money lending’ 
on an international basis is also difficult due to imprecise usage 
of a range of overlapping terms. Marinaro (2017, p.202) 
noted that ‘in the Italian context, the term most widely used, 
across all registers, is usura and informal lenders are usually 
called usurai. However, it has taken on a spectrum of meanings. 
Most dictionaries define it both as lending money for any 
interest and for excessive interest’. Devoto and Oli (2007; 
see Marinaro, 2017, p.202), in focusing on the dictionary 
definition of ‘illegal money lending’, specifically the term usura, 
note that the extended term usuraio is ‘a person dominated by 
sordid avarice’ with the implication being that there is a social, 
cultural and moral condemnation connected with lending 
money illegally (Devoto and Oli, 2007). The condemnatory 
perception of illegal moneylenders is also reflected in the 
Italian colloquial equivalents of common English terms relating 
to illegal money lending. For example, local equivalents to the 
English term ‘loan shark’ are the colloquial Italian term strozzino 
(‘strangler’) and the specifically Roman term cravattaro (‘tie-
maker’). Both graphically evoke gradual suffocation and 
eventual economic death (Marinaro, 2017, p.202).
In theory, however, each of the terms (‘loan sharking’, 
‘unauthorised lending’, ‘usury’) has a distinct meaning in 
relation to divergence from, or disregard for, the regulatory 
rules governing the legal lending of money.
The term ‘loan shark’ has been used widely in policing. 
According to the Illegal Money Lending Team within West 
Sussex Police, ‘loan shark activity is characterised by deliberate 
criminal fraud and theft, with extortionate rates of interest on 
loans that mean borrowers face demands for payment of 
thousands of pounds more than they borrowed and can often 
never pay off the loans’ (Director of Public Protection, 2015, 
p.2). Loan sharking in this context is readily understood as 
denoting clear exploitation. According to Mayer (2012, p. 
828), ‘loan sharking is not the annual percentage rate lenders 
charge, but the length of time expensive debt endures. Loan 
sharking is debt-trapping; it is a predatory  practice that consists 
in renewing short-term loans again and again in order to 
maximise fee income.’ These interpretations of loan sharking 
(which focus on the exploitative nature of the debt itself rather 
than how its collection is ‘enforced’) differ from the classic 
definitions within the American literature in relation to organised 
crime, whereby loan sharking consists of two distinct criminal 
endeavours: the charging of exorbitant rates of interest on 
a loan, and the threat or use of violence to collect the debt 
(Malcolm and Curtin, 1968; Goldstock and Coenen, 1980).
In other places, illegal money lending is conflated with the term 
‘usury’. For example, Mugellini (2012, p.75) defines usury as 
‘loans at interest rates that are illegal and make their repayment 
very difficult or impossible’.  Alternatively, Dugato (2013, 
p.82) defines it as ‘loans made by banks, private persons, 
criminal groups or other businesses at an exorbitant or illegally 
high interest rate’. As Marinaro (2017, p.203) notes, the key 
difference between the definitions is that the first would not 
include a loan that is illegal, but which the borrower is able to 
repay. Conversely, the second definition acknowledges that 
loans do not have to be illegal to be classified as ‘exorbitant’. 
This is an important distinction to highlight as not all illegal 
money lending is exploitative and not all loans that are 
exploitative are by illegal lenders. This definitional distinction 
crystallises the difficulty in assimilating legal constructs with 
sociocultural norms. 
In all cases, however, it is also important to recognise that the 
debt engendered by money lending generally also creates 
social hierarchies and dependencies and can reinforce existing 
power relations in communities (Guérin, 2014). Any theoretical 
exposition of debt reveals that there is considerable difference 
between an economic or economistic view and a social or 
everyday community understanding. On an economistic point 
of view, the repayment of debt ‘concludes the relationship’ 
between the borrower and the lender; however, Guérin (2014) 
argues that this is not simple at community level, and that the 
social impact of debt and money lending precludes a universal 
and unequivocal definition of debt:
The history and anthropology of debt reveals that debt is 
both shaped by and constitutive of social relationships, 
moral values, and culture. Debt has no universal meanings 
but a variety of meanings and formulations within particular 
contexts (Guérin, 2014, p.540).
Durst (2015, p.34) similarly argues that ‘The history of debt 
shows that debt is both shaped by and constitutive of social 
relations, moral values and culture, and that debt occurs 
within dependency chains that extend far beyond monetary 
repayments’. Understanding the sociocultural and historic 
context and pattern of lending, and the relationships that both 
create and sustain it, is therefore vital. It is important to consider 
the many ways in which debt has been ‘normalised’, with illegal 
money lending and loan sharking being only one extreme 
manifestation of an otherwise largely accepted practice for 
those on low incomes to seek out alternative forms of credit 
(Johnstone, 1985).
1.1.2 Historic context of credit in the UK
Irish historian Sean O’Connell (2009) has produced one 
of the most nuanced pieces of work on the emergence and 
establishment of the credit sector in the UK throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Drawing upon archival 
work, alongside interviews with more than 30 individuals, 
O’Connell utilises an oral history approach to chart the 
development of ‘borrowing’ and ‘lending’ in working-class 
areas of Belfast. The establishment of ‘tallymen’ or ‘credit 
drapers’ in the late nineteenth century in working-class 
cities across the UK and present day Republic of Ireland 
corresponded with an increased demand for cheaper clothing, 
which could be paid off in weekly instalments. O’Connell notes 
that what was crucial to the ‘success’ of such endeavours was 
the personal relationships that were established between the 
lender and the borrower ‘on the doorstep’ in working-class 
communities. This was based on the social nature of credit 
and the routine ‘gifting patterns’ (referred to by Bourdieu and 
Mauss) of pre-modern society, which were based on reciprocity 
and trust (Finn, 2003). Indeed, Taylor (2002) refers to the 
weekly call to collect money as providing ‘ontological security’ 
for those borrowing on their doorstep, with the emotional and 
economic aspects of borrowing and debt deeply intertwined.
Although the ‘tallymen’ were replaced in post-war Britain  by 
the rapid growth of mail order catalogues (such as Littlewoods), 
this relational nature of access to credit remained vital. But 
rather than the white, middle-class male, who became the 
stereotype of the post-war ‘consumer’, O’Connell (2009, 
p.13) argues that it was in fact, ‘cash-poor, credit desperate’ 
working-class females who managed household finances 
who were at the centre of the doorstep credit and lending 
industry.  However, with the decline of catalogue companies,  
computerised credit assessment became more important than 
neighbours ‘assessing’ and ‘trusting’ one another (ibid.). Yet 
the higher levels of interest (and debt) on such loans provided 
the conditions for the emergence of the Credit Union sector 
in the UK and Ireland from the 1960s onwards (Johnstone, 
1985), although there is an important distinction to be made 
in relation to the sector in the UK generally and Northern 
Ireland more specifically. In the UK, Credit Unions tended to 
focus on supporting those on low incomes, while in Northern 
Ireland, these institutions tended to be developed for the entire 
local community, and therefore included more ‘middle-class’ 
members than their counterparts in the rest of the UK (Jones, 
2013).  This is perhaps evidenced by the fact that 41.8.% of 
adults in Northern Ireland are registered with a Credit Union 
compared to just 3.42% in the UK generally (Bank of England, 
2020). This point shall be revisited in section 2.2, when policy 
responses to debt and illegal money lending are considered.
O’Connell (2009) also charts the changing attitudes 
towards credit and debt, and corresponding state response, 
throughout the twentieth century. Typically, those borrowing 
on the doorstep were perceived as ‘feckless’ and ‘reckless’ 
spenders, views confirmed in a 1969 UK consumer survey 
on credit wherein the majority of respondents believed its use 
to be ‘wrong’. However, a similar survey conducted in 1979 
indicated that public attitudes were now more accepting 
towards the accrual of debt. This gradual societal acceptance 
of debt matched the state policy switch from pre-Second World 
War efforts to reduce the attraction of such forms of credit to 
a post-war concern with regulating its use (O’Connell, 2009) 
and, in particular, educating consumers on debt management 
and ‘financial literacy’ (Hilton, 2003). As O’Connell (2009) 
documents, the Crowther Committee on Consumer Credit 
report in the UK in 1971 eventually led to the creation of 
the Consumer Credit Act of 1974. This Act made it essential 
for creditors to indicate the annual percentage rate (APR) 
associated with their products, which was intended to make 
borrowers aware of the ‘true cost’ of their borrowing. But, as 
O’Connell notes, various surveys subsequently revealed that 
customers still failed to understand the concept of APR and how 
much money they owed.
What is particularly interesting from O’Connell’s work is 
the response of his working-class interviewees, who tended 
to define credit and debt differently to their interviewer. 
O’Connell’s interviewees only ever referred to being in debt 
when asked directly towards the end of the interview; prior 
to this, they had stressed how they were ‘never in debt’ and 
‘managed’ their budget, despite the economic difficulties. 
Interviewees did not believe that the fact that an agent called 
to the house once a week to collect money meant they were in 
debt – they only tended to perceive someone as being in debt 
if they could not afford to make the payments. The significance 
of O’Connell’s work is that it identifies the wider sociocultural 
(and economic) context of borrowing, which, other than the 
obvious lack of access to alternative forms of mainstream credit 
(from banks and building societies), tends to be based upon 
trust, ease, routine, and personal relationships ‘on the doorstep’ 
in working-class communities. These are dynamics that ‘payday 
lenders’ and, at times, loan sharks have also relied upon to 
develop their practices. 
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1.1.3 Financial context: 
The growth of the sub-prime loan sector
The effects of the 2007/2008 global economic downturn 
are still being felt today in the UK and Ireland in terms of the 
increasing numbers of people ‘at risk’ of living in poverty, the 
rise of insecure and low-paid employment,  an increase in 
levels of negative equity, the fall in ‘real’ wage levels, and a 
culture of limited public support for those in financial distress 
(Machin, 2015). As of 2016, an estimated 8.3 million people 
in the UK had ‘problem debts’, with one in six adults missing 
payments for credit card or utility bills in three or more of the 
previous six months (Mosedale et al., 2018).
While there is debate within the literature as to the primary 
causes for how and why personal debt occurs (macro-
economic factors versus ‘reckless’ consumer borrowing and 
spending; see Benito, 2006; Jappelli and Padula, 2013; 
Montgomerie et al., 2014; Walker et al., 2015; Mosedale et 
al., 2018), there is general consensus that debt is associated 
with poor physical and mental health and well-being 
(Dearden et al., 2015; Zegarra-Liñares and Wilson, 2017).  
In Northern Ireland, half of Christians Against Poverty’s clients 
with debt have either considered, or attempted, suicide; the 
corresponding figure for the UK as a whole was one person 
in three (NICVA, 2013, p.7). In a similar manner, the Forum 
for Action on Substance Abuse (FASA) in Belfast found that of 
55 clients who reported debt as their main problem, 29 were 
feeling suicidal (52.7%) (ibid.). 
In such a context, it is perhaps unsurprising that those living 
with debt may make decisions that appear from the outside to 
be ‘irrational’, as living in financial difficulty has been found 
to impair cognitive judgement (Mani et al., 2013; Kirsch et 
al., 2014). Individuals may indeed take greater risks in their 
decisions when they are in financial need (see Livingstone and 
Lunt, 1992; Ermer et al., 2008; Mishra and Fiddick, 2012; 
Szilagyiova, 2015). In such a context, as noted by O’Connell 
(2009) in his study of the use of ‘doorstep’ credit in Belfast, 
debt can become ‘normalised’, with those in debt not seeking 
help, even when they most need it (Flaherty and Banks, 2013; 
Mosedale et al., 2018).
A key driver of debt is the lack of personal/household savings, 
and residents of the UK and Ireland generally rank among 
the lowest savers and highest borrowers in Western Europe, 
leaving them particularly vulnerable to a financial shock or 
the gradual increasing of the burden of interest and debt 
repayments (Kempson, 2002; Deeming et al., 2011; Zegarra-
Liñares and Wilson, 2017). For example, OECD data in 
relation to debt for 2008/2009 found that the UK had a higher 
than average debt-to-income ratio – 171% of disposable 
household income in 2009 (mortgages accounted for 133% of 
this figure). By comparison, the household debt-to-income ratio 
in France and Germany is lower; in France, the figure is 107%, 
with mortgages accounting for 77% of this; and in Germany, 
the debt-to-income ratio is 99% (with 67% accounted for by 
mortgages) (see Deeming et al., 2011).
In a report assessing the ‘financial health’ of households, Legal 
and General (2012) found that the average citizen in the UK 
has only enough savings to last for 19 days in the event of a 
financial crisis or emergency.  Perhaps even more worryingly, in 
2016, four out of ten UK residents had less than the equivalent 
of one week’s wages saved (Bouyon and Oliinyk, 2019). The 
situation is perhaps even starker in Northern Ireland, which is 
the UK region with the lowest proportion of citizens with savings 
of more than £100 (Money Advice Service, 2016).
An additional issue with regard to promoting ‘financial 
inclusion’  is for adults to have access to a bank account 
(Bridges and Disney, 2004). This has improved in Northern 
Ireland in recent years, with 97% of households reported as 
having at least one adult with some form of bank account in 
2017/18, up from 94% in 2007/08, possibly due to the 
policy of paying benefits directly into the bank accounts of 
claimants (DfC, 2019a). However, Northern Irish citizens do 
tend to be in greater levels of debt than their counterparts in 
the UK; according to Bank of England figures on Credit Union 
usage, the average personal loan each adult in Northern 
Ireland has amounts to £1,109; this can be contrasted with the 
figure of £745 in Great Britain (Bank of England, 2018).
On the surface, recent statistics would appear to indicate 
that the economic situation in Northern Ireland is improving. 
Unemployment in the first quarter of 2019 has fallen to just 
3%, below the UK average of 4% (NISRA, 2019),  and 
the proportions of adults and children living in poverty has 
fallen by 2% and 3%, respectively, within the past 12 months 
(DfC, 2019b).  However, 16% of the population in Northern 
Ireland, and 19% of children, continue to live in poverty 
(ibid.). It must further be noted that despite the number of 
people in work rising by 16,000 over the first quarter of 2019 
and now standing at 860,000, more than half of those who 
are unemployed in Northern Ireland (56%) are long-term 
unemployed. This can be contrasted with the figure for the UK 
as a whole, which stands at 26% (DfC, 2019b; NISRA, 2019).  
Northern Ireland also retains the rather dubious distinction of 
having the lowest discretionary income of any UK region. 
In such an economic context, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
the short-term high-interest loan, or sub-prime sector,  has 
expanded notably in recent years in the UK and the Republic 
of Ireland (Lane and Rodrigues, 2015).  Indeed, both countries 
have a much more developed sub-prime loan sector than 
countries such as France and Germany, which historically 
have had a cap on interest rates on short-term high-interest 
loans and greater levels of financial regulation (Deeming et al., 
2011). In the UK, ‘the market of ‘high cost short-term credit’ 
grew from £300 million in 2006 to £2.5 billion in 2013 (a 
growth rate of more than 700%), decreasing to £1.5 billion by 
mid-2016’ (Bouyon and Oliinyk, 2019, p.7).  Although there 
is no single definition of what constitutes a sub-prime loan, the 
EU suggests it typically includes three key factors: a short time 
frame (typically three months or less); small amounts of money 
(in hundreds rather than thousands of pounds); and high levels 
of interest (over 100% APR, with many reaching more than 
1,000% APR)  (Bouyon and Oliinyk, 2019). Sub-prime loans 
can refer to:
• ‘Payday’ loans (provided by companies such as 
‘QuickQuid’ or ‘Wonga’) : This tends to involve a small 
advance of money against a post-dated paycheque for the 
amount of the loan plus the interest; 
• ‘Doorstep’ loans: These loans tend to involve a slightly larger 
amount of money over a three- to six-month period, and 
as O’Connell (2009) noted in his Belfast study, are highly 




• Rent-to-own sources and catalogue purchases; and
• Peer-to-peer lending platforms (Lawrence and Cooke, 
2014; Bouyon and Oliinyk, 2019).
Those who are seeking out sub-prime loans typically do so 
because they:
• May have a poor credit rating or are excluded from the 
mainstream banking system (do not have a bank account); 
• Are seeking small amounts, which usually fall short of the 
bank threshold for a personal loan (in 2014 the FCA found 
that the average payday loan was just £260, which was 
required to be paid back over 30 days. Most bank personal 
loans are of £1,000 or more) (see Lane and Rodrigues, 
2015); 
• Are on low-incomes (including those who are unemployed) 
with little or no savings (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). 
Estimates suggest that two thirds of those who take out a 
payday loan in the UK are from households with an income 
of less than £25,000 per annum (Burton, 2010; Lawrence 
and Cooke, 2014);
• Have been on the receiving end of benefit sanctions. For 
example, Lawrence and Cooke (2014) noted that between 
September 2012 and September 2013 in the UK, there 
was an increase of 16% in the use of such sanctions (from 
751,943 to 874,850). Even low-level sanctions result in the 
loss of all benefits for a four-week period.
• Have an unexpected life event (death of a partner, divorce, 
job loss, fall into poor health);
• Need to pay their utility bills, rent/mortgage; fix their 
car; pay for home heating oil or purchase white goods 
at short-notice (see NICVA, 2013; FCA, 2014; Bouyon 
and Oliinyk, 2019). 
Paying bills and providing for daily living expenses are the 
two most cited reasons for requiring a sub-prime loan, which 
is contrary to the typical stereotype of the ‘reckless’ consumer 
who gets into financial difficulty by purchasing luxury items 
(Schwartz and Robinson, 2017; Mosedale et al., 2018). The 
perceived appeal of payday loans in particular is that they are 
often an online and relatively anonymous process (and one 
can therefore forego the embarrassment of being turned down 
by a bank in person for a loan); they are quick and the money 
can be in your account on the same day as your application; 
credit checks have historically been much less robust than 
in the mainstream banking system; they are clear about fees 
(customers understood being told how much money they owed 
rather than the more nebulous concept of APR rates); and 
they are viewed as short-term solutions to debt, and ‘less 
risky’ than longer-term alternatives such as credit cards and 
overdrafts, which may incur hidden charges (Burton, 2010; 
Gloukoviezoff, 2014). 
 
Research conducted in London (based upon a survey and 
client data from the debt advice organisation StepChange 
and Citizens Advice) on the usage of payday loans in the 
UK found that: 
• Those under 40 years of age were most likely to use 
‘payday’ loans (over 25% of clients of StepChange are 
under 25, only 1.3% are 60 or over); 
• The largest single category of those seeking help with advice 
from Citizens Advice was single men without children (31%). 
The second largest group was single women (21%). Couples 
with children (12%) accounted for almost one in ten of those 
seeking advice;
• In 2009 the average number of outstanding ‘payday’ loans 
owed by a StepChange client was 1.6, although by 2012 
this rose to three;
• Those in rented accommodation were more likely than home 
owners to seek advice;
• Payday loans were often part of wider personal/household 
debt, such as that accrued on various credit cards (Lawrence 
and Cooke, 2014, p.16).
While research has found that some individuals using sub-prime 
loans found them beneficial in the short term if they repaid 
them quickly and did not default (Burton, 2010), in general, 
the evidence would suggest that the historic lack of regulation 
in the sector in the UK has led to significant exploitation 
of borrowers by companies seeing to further their profits 
(Mosedale et al., 2018).  This often took the form of not being 
clear with customers on charges for defaulting on payments and 
encouraging borrowers to ‘roll over’ on loans (Burton, 2010; 
Caplan, 2014). Similar poor practice has been found in the 
short-term loan sector in Northern Ireland (NICVA, 2013). 
The primary difficulty with such short-term loans is that, given 
the risk associated with the borrowers, the interest rates are very 
high, and debt can spiral out of control if they are not repaid 
quickly (Agarwal et al., 2013; Lawrence and Cooke, 2014).  
This led to a number of payday loan companies being accused 
of ‘irresponsible lending that leads to a long-term debt spiral’ 
(Szilagyiova, 2015, p.843; see also CMA, 2015; Falconer 
and Lane, 2017), particularly given that most borrowers are 
repeat customers, some of whom are taking out new loans in 
an attempt to pay off old ones (Burton, 2010). The Office of 
Fair Trading (2010; see also Burton, 2010) found that almost 
30% of loans in the UK were not repaid on the initial repayment 
date, while the Irish League of Credit Unions found that 43% 
of clients who took out payday loans could not afford to make 
their repayments, resulting in an even worse credit rating 
(NICVA, 2013). But despite the difficulties, high-cost sub-prime 
and payday loans remain in demand as ‘the need for credit is 
often immediate, and consumers don’t have time to apply for 
a mainstream loan, risk getting declined, then start the process 
again with another lender’ (FCA, 2019, p.35). Therefore, they 
‘are the only viable, legal option for those who do not have 
savings or family and friends to fall back on’ (Lawrence and 
Cooke, 2014, p.2).
In 2014, stricter criteria were placed on payday loans by the 
newly established Financial Conduct Authority, which took over 
regulatory powers on the sub-prime sector from the Office of 
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Fair Trading. These increased regulations included strengthened 
affordability checks, compulsory signposting to debt advice, 
and limits on how many times a loan could ‘roll over’ (Bouyon 
and Oliinyk, 2019). The evidence would appear to suggest 
that these limitations have reduced the number of payday loans. 
In the first quarter of 2014, there were 9,243 ‘problems’ with 
such loans encountered by Citizens Advice in England; this fell 
to 5,554 by the first quarter of 2015 (ibid.). But as Lane and 
Rodrigues (2015, p.3) ask, ‘The question now is where will the 
demand for short-term credit go, given the contraction of the 
payday lending market?’ There have been some suggestions 
that stricter criteria on such loans could push some individuals 
towards loan sharks (Deeming et al., 2011); thus, ‘If payday 
lending is denied, illegal forms of credit may be the only 
alternative’ (Burton, 2010, p.16).
However, this is disputed by Mosedale et al. (2018, p.320), 
who suggest that ‘there is debate about whether restricting 
access to payday loans risks driving people into the arms of 
illegal loan sharks’. Indeed, the Centre for Responsible Credit 
pointed out that post-2012, when the FCA highlighted the 
changes it would be making to the regulations, ‘payday lending 
decreased with no apparent increase in illegal lending; on 
the contrary the number of investigations conducted by the 
Government’s Illegal Money Lending Team dropped sharply. 
In fact, servicing high interest payday loan debt may itself 
encourage the use of illegal lenders’ (Mosedale et al., 
2018, p.320).
While there is no conclusive evidence that the contraction of the 
sub-prime loan sector in the UK has contributed to individuals 
with no other credit options using illegal money lenders and 
loan sharks, the socio-economic conditions that contribute to 
individuals turning to both sub-prime and illegal money lenders 
increase the likelihood that this is the case. It is to this specific 
consideration of the literature on loan sharking and illegal 
money lending that the report now turns.
1.1.4 Loan sharking and illegal money 
lending: A review of the evidence
It must be noted at the outset that there is a lack of empirical 
data and research generally on illegal money lending and 
loan sharking within the literature across differing countries and 
contexts. This is primarily as a result of the criminal nature of the 
activity, which not only makes it very difficult for researchers 
to access (Savona and Michele, 2015), but also results in a 
reluctance among victims to come forward to ‘tell their story’ 
(Goldstock and Coenen, 1980; DTI, 2007). Indeed, in their 
comprehensive review of the evidence in a pan-European 
context, Bouyon and Oliinyk (2019, p.29) found that ‘No 
empirical publication that aims at appreciating the volume 
and dynamics in illegal loans has been identified’.  This is also 
the case in Northern Ireland, where it has been suggested 
that ‘researching illegal lending is ‘problematic’ – given its 
underground nature and the threat of intimidation and violence’ 
(NICVA, 2013, p.8).  Consequently, the very limited evidence 
base tends to be based upon anecdotal ‘stories’ and piecemeal 
bits of information, which can be gleaned from larger pieces of 
work whose main aim is to assess the issues of credit and debt 
more generally. While acknowledging these methodological 
limitations, this section will attempt to highlight the key themes 
emerging from the evidence that is available.
The historic literature on loan sharking and illegal money 
lending in the United States suggests that the practices are 
dominated by organised crime gangs (OCGs) (Malcolm and 
Curtin, 1968; Seidl, 1968; Goldstock and Coenen, 1980). 
The primary reason cited for the involvement of OCGs in loan 
sharking (as it is typically referred to in the American literature) 
is twofold: firstly, OCGs have access to large reserves of 
cash that they can lend to those in need at short notice; and 
secondly, involvement in such activity provides the opportunity 
for the gangs to ‘wash’ or launder their money from other 
criminal activities (Malcolm and Curtin, 1968; Goldstock and 
Coenen, 1980).  In this regard, loan sharking is viewed as 
closely associated with the distribution of drugs (‘narcotics’) and 
illegal gambling in particular (ibid.).  This involvement of OCGs 
in loan sharking to launder money from drugs and gambling 
activity was also found to be the case in a much more recent 
study of criminal activity across Western Europe, including 
in the UK and the Republic of Ireland (Savona and Michele, 
2015). What is crucial to the role of OCGs in loan sharking is 
the fear and intimidation induced by their involvement, wherein 
‘the aura of fear is critical to success in the loan sharking 
business’ (ibid., p.134).
In his classic doctoral thesis upon the topic, Seidl (1968) 
suggested that there are four characteristics that are crucial 
to the success of loan sharking: the secrecy of the transaction; 
the informality; the speed and convenience of it; and, the 
regular availability of funds. Interestingly, all of these factors 
were referred to in the previous section when the benefits of 
payday loans in a UK context where discussed, and therefore 
there is likely to be some overlap in terms of those individuals 
in debt who are turning to loan sharks as a last resort.  In a UK 
context, more than eight out of ten users of illegal moneylenders 
referred to doing so because they had no other credit options 
(DTI, 2007). As Goldstock and Coenen note (1980, p.137), 
the demand for loan sharks ‘results at least in part from legally 
imposed interest-rate ceilings that preclude legal lenders from 
satisfying the demand of high-risk borrowers … The loan-shark 
fills the gap between market demand and legal supply.’ This is 
particularly the case when, as on a small number of occasions, 
loan sharks may offer more competitive rates of APR than 
their legal short-term loan competitors (Goldstock and 
Coenen, 1980). 
Three types of borrowers have been identified within the classic 
American literature:
• The ‘legitimate individual’: Defined as a ‘victim’ and most 
typically ‘a lower-class urban labourer’ who may have an 
issue with gambling or addiction; 
• The ‘criminal borrower’: In an American context, this tends to 
relate to ‘Mob’ bookmakers; and 
• The ‘legitimate businessman/woman’ who is struggling to 
keep their workplace afloat (Malcolm and Curtin, 1968; 
Seidl, 1968; Goldstock and Coenen, 1980). 
More recent work on illegal lending in the UK, however, would 
suggest that it is not just OCGs that are involved in the practice. 
Ellison et al. (2006) suggested that up to 40% of illegal 
payments were collected by lenders themselves, and involved 
smaller groups of individuals (and family members) relying 
upon (and exploiting) their social networks rather than the more 
impersonal and hierarchical structure of more organised and 
larger criminal enterprises dealing with ‘strangers’.
While a cross-European report on criminal activity 
acknowledged this dynamic to be the case, it also found that 
in the Northern Irish context, OCGs in the form of loyalist 
and republican paramilitary groups were heavily involved in 
‘extortion and racketeering’ (Savona and Michele, 2015). It 
should be noted, however, that although there is a large corpus 
of academic literature on loyalist and republican paramilitary 
organisations, which also makes reference to the more general 
criminal practices of ‘extortion’ and ‘racketeering’ as a means 
of funding political violence (Bruce, 1992; English, 2003; 
Wood, 2006; Moloney; 2007; Edwards, 2017), there is 
little or no reference at any point to their specific involvement 
in loan sharking or illegal money lending.  This is despite the 
fact that there is evidence to suggest that paramilitaries are 
involved in the practice in Northern Ireland. Indeed, in recent 
years, Operations Waggel, Microscopal and Midwifery have 
targeted senior members of a loyalist paramilitary group who 
were ‘involved in money lending/laundering and the supply of 
controlled drugs. An amount of cash circa £10,000 was lifted 
under the Proceeds of Crime Act (2002)’ (NCA, 2018, p.5). 
Although the Illegal Money Lending Teams, established in 
England, Scotland and Wales (but not Northern Ireland) in 
2004, estimate that there are perhaps 310,000 households 
in the UK (excluding Northern Ireland) that are in debt to an 
illegal lender (IMLT, 2017),  between 2004 and 2013, only 
two cases of ‘illegal loan sharking’ had been referred to the 
Trading Standards Service in Northern Ireland (NICVA, 2013, 
p.14). Anecdotal and case-study evidence has, however, 
highlighted the impact, if not necessarily the scale, of the 
practice in Northern Ireland (NICVA, 2013). It was noted that, 
‘it can be very difficult with illegal lending to establish what the 
original loan was – so the debt never gets fully paid off and the 
victim does not want to go to the police’ (ibid., p.8). The report 
also notes another example referred to by FASA, whereby:
In one of FASA’s cases a young man borrowed £20 from 
a paramilitary organisation with the understanding that he 
had to pay back £35; this debt spiralled to £1,400. The 
individual in question, who had severe mental health issues, 
had his benefits taken by the paramilitaries and he resorted 
to begging in order to survive. In time a local community 
worker helped re-work the debt. Another FASA client was 
‘caught’ by local paramilitaries selling heroin and was 
‘fined’ £5,000. By the time FASA became involved £2,000 
had been paid to the paramilitary organisation. FASA was 
able to negotiate an end to the debt (ibid., p.9). 
Given the threats, intimidation, and at times outright violence 
used by loan sharks to collect their debts – whether OCGs or 
otherwise – it is important to consider why some individuals 
still resort to using them. An important caveat to recognise is 
that there is no homogenous reason why a person may use an 
illegal money lender as a financial resource. Each individual 
circumstance is culturally, socially and economically distinct. 
The FCA (2017, para. 1.2), in citing anecdotal evidence 
gathered as part of an extensive research report on consumer 
experiences of unauthorised money lending in the United 
Kingdom, noted: ‘The common theme we heard is that the 
consumers that use such lenders have exhausted all available 
resources and have a desperate and urgent need for money, 
often being tipped into using it by a crisis or unexpected 
particular shortfall in income’. The report additionally 
highlighted three important aspects regarding illegal 
money lending:
• That unauthorised lending has been prevalent in communities 
for generations (hence the discussion on the historic and 
cultural context of debt within section 1.2 of this review 
of the literature);
• That it is an element in all areas of the United Kingdom and 
not limited only to certain localities; and
• That there is a strong correlation between areas of high 
economic deprivation (particularly in social and rented 
housing estates) and the volume of illegal money lending 
(Financial Conduct Authority, 2017, para. 3.1).
Dagdeviren at al. (2019) concur with the observation that 
there is a connection between low-income households that 
experience unexpected variance in income and a dependence 
on illegal money lenders. This situation has manifestly increased 
within the UK following the financial crisis in 2007/2008 with 
some low-income households utilising illegal money lending for 
basic household essentials (ibid., p.2).  
In November 2018, the Community Wellbeing Board of the 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities published research 
findings from a study into illegal money lending. The research 
was commissioned by the Scottish Illegal Money Lending Team 
to analyse the changing borrowing patterns of individuals 
resorting to illegal money lenders. The research concluded that 
‘a loss of income due to a change in benefits is a major driver 
for people being forced into the position of using an illegal 
money lender or facing the prospect of no electricity and no 
food. This includes being sanctioned or transferring to Universal 
Credit as part of the issue’ (Cosla, 2018, p.2). In addition, 
the report pointed to personal circumstances stimulated by 
addictions, loss of earnings and difficult or abusive domestic 
relationships as significant factors in people turning to illegal 
moneylenders (ibid.). Significantly, the report highlighted that 
respondents felt that they had been subjected to intimidation 
and threats by money lenders, a situation which, as the 
American literature suggests, is rendered even more threatening 
by the perceived criminal group associations of the illegal 
money lenders:
Pursuit for payment was typically experienced immediately 
after receipt of benefits. Interviewees had experienced 
threats, often of serious violence, setting out the 
consequences of not paying. Intimidation could take the 
form of a sustained campaign which might also target family 
members. Lenders’ membership of a gang, or criminal 
associations could reinforce threats, or make explicit threats 
unnecessary (Cosla, 2018, p.3).
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This report built on the findings from research conducted in 
2017 by the Illegal Money Lending Team in England. The 
survey of 122 victims of illegal money lending found that:
• 54% were female and 46% male and the age of borrowers 
ranged from 20–73;
• 50% of victims were parents with on average two children;
• 47% of clients reported a long-term health condition 
(including 12% who said they had mental health issues);
• 32% of victims said they had considered taking their own life 
at some point in their lives – 25% of whom attributed this to 
the activities of loan sharks;
• 76% said they were in a state of ‘worry’ or ‘distress’ as a 
result of loan sharks; 
• 43% said they had been abused verbally, threatened or 
physically harmed as a result of going to a loan shark;
• 70% lived in rented accommodation;
• 36% of those who borrowed from a loan shark were 
unemployed, 23% were employed full-time, 20% were self-
employed, 15% employed part-time, 3% were retired and 
2% were students;
• 58% of victims were claiming benefits at the time and 
19% had visited food banks in the previous year;
• 94% had a bank account;
• 66% were told about the lender by friends or family 
(IMLT, 2017).
The trends revealed by these statistics are reminiscent of 
those documented by DTI (2007, p.16) in relation to the first 
evaluation of the Illegal Money Lending Teams in England, 
Scotland and Wales. This evaluation found that: 
• Approximately one in five users of illegal lenders live in 
areas not served by the home credit lenders;
• Just over 50% are home credit customers who have 
defaulted on or reached the limit of their credit line;
• Around 25% are those who are too ‘high-risk’, even for the 
high-cost sub-prime sector;
• The profile of those using illegal lenders is similar to that of 
home credit users (most users are female, with families, and 
aged 30–40).  However, there is a higher proportion of 
males using illegal lenders, and they are even more likely to 
be from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds than 
those using legal sub-prime loans. 
In an international context, it is interesting to contrast the UK 
experiences of low-income households in a financial crisis 
and post-crisis situation with the post-apartheid experiences of 
consumers in South Africa. James (2014) argued that rather 
than borrowing money for essential household needs, there was 
a growth in illegal money lending in parts of South Africa as 
individuals borrowed to facilitate an aspirational lifestyle: 
The supply of, and demand for, credit interacted in a 
complex relationship to facilitate the rapid growth of a new 
middle class as well as promise of fulfilment to a far larger 
group of people. Such credit was being used, not simply for 
materialistic consumerism, but to satisfy the desire for what 
was felt necessary for a good life (James, 2014, s17).
An important factor when considering why illegal money 
lending is so pervasive in some communities is the sociocultural 
normality of illegal money lending within certain areas. The 
FCA has emphasised that people are accustomed to engaging 
with illegal money lenders who they regard as familiar to them 
and they see this as part of normal, day-to-day interactions 
within the community. Indeed, the FCA has posited that this 
familiarity, coupled with an unawareness or lack of knowledge 
of the possibility of receiving loans or credit legally, 
served to reinforce the sociocultural pervasiveness 
of illegal money lending:
Many of our partners observed that lack of financial 
education, in tandem with custom and practice in some 
communities, supported continued use of unauthorised 
lenders. For example, borrowers may have grown up in 
places where the unauthorised lender was a familiar part of 
the culture: when they need to get money urgently they know 
where to go (Financial Conduct Authority, 2017, para.3.8).
The opportunistic nature of illegal money lending in targeting 
‘vulnerable’ individuals in need (and perhaps retaining their 
benefit books or bank cards; see DTI, 2007) is exemplified by 
the availability of unauthorised loans for people who may be 
termed ‘unbankable’ by formal, legal lenders. Durst (2015) has 
argued that those deemed to be unbankable are considered a 
significant asset in illegal money lending parlance due to their 
inability to repay money they borrow.
The community-centric nature of illegal money lending and the 
disparate relationship between money lender and borrower 
reinforces power differentials within communities. Again, this is 
likely to be particularly problematic in Northern Ireland, given 
that illegal lending typically occurs within close-knit working-
class communities (DTI, 2007),  and paramilitary organisations 
continue to have a presence in many of these areas. While 
some of these organisations are actively seeking to ‘transition’ 
away from the legacies of the past, others remain deeply 
enmeshed in criminality and violence (NIO, 2015). This poses 
the question: ‘How does the criminal justice system respond 
to dealing with such instances of loan sharking and illegal 
money lending?’
1.2 Criminal justice and policy response
This section is divided into two parts. The first half will discuss 
the legislative and criminal justice system response to illegal 
money lending by focusing on the UK specifically, but also by 
utilising examples from other jurisdictions. The second half then 
proceeds to highlight a number of approaches that aim to keep 
citizens out of debt, most notably in the form of promoting the 
use of Credit Unions and developing education work focusing 
upon financial ‘literacy’.
1.2.1 Criminal justice response
From a legislative perspective, illegal money lending has 
principally been prosecuted under two distinct acts: the 
Consumer Credit Act 1974 and the often concomitantly 
applied Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.  It is important to note 
a geographical inconsistency within the United Kingdom 
regarding certain provisions of the Proceeds of Crime Act 
2002. In Scotland, following a public consultation in relation to 
strengthening the power of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, the 
Scottish government made amendments in 2011 to the lifestyle 
offences section (schedule 4) of the Act. Of specific concern to 
illegal money lending was the addition of a Consumer Credit 
provision: ‘An offence under section 39(1) of the Consumer 
Credit Act 1974 (offences against Part III) if it concerns the 
carrying on of a consumer credit business (as defined in section 
189(1) of that Act).’ 
A consumer credit business, as defined by the Consumer 
Credit Act 1974, ‘means any business being carried on by 
a person so far as it comprises or relates to (a) the provision 
of credit by him, or (b) otherwise his being a creditor’.  The 
legislative provision pertaining to illegal money lending in the 
Consumer Credit Act 1974 is broad: ‘A person who engages 
in any activities for which a licence is required when he is not 
a licensee under a licence covering those activities commits 
an offence.’ As referred to previously, the Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002 is often applied concomitantly to the Consumer 
Credit Act 1974 and this is due, in part, to the difficulty for the 
criminal justice system in responding to illegal money lending, 
necessitating the utilisation of a range of statutes. As noted in 
R v Dowse (2017, p.215), ‘statutory provisions are intended 
to provide condign punishment for those who engage in 
unlicensed money lending, for the obvious and proper reason 
that the vulnerable should be protected’.  
It is important to note the criminal justice system application 
of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 in conjunction with other 
statutes regarding sentencing for offenders. It was decided in R 
v Greaves (2011) that a person should not be punished twice 
for what is the same offence. Therefore, the deciding factor is 
whether the conduct in the Proceeds of Crime Act offence adds 
any culpability to the primary offence. If the Proceeds of Crime 
offence does not add to the culpability of the primary offence, 
then there should not be a consecutive sentence applied to the 
offender. This test is known as the Greaves principle:
(c) Where the offenders are one and the same, if the 
conduct involved in Proceeds of Crime Act offence in 
reality adds nothing to the culpability of the conduct 
involved in the primary offence, there should be no 
additional penalty. A person should not be punished 
twice for the same conduct. That can be achieved either 
by imposing ‘no separate penalty’ on the Proceeds of Crime 
Act offence or by a concurrent sentence where the primary 
sentence is imprisonment. 
Following the successes of the Illegal Money Lending Teams 
in England, Scotland and Wales, the government instituted 
changes to reform consumer credit regulation in the United 
Kingdom through the Bank of England and Financial Services 
Act 2016. The practical implication of the reformed regulations 
included responsibility for regulating consumer credit from the 
Office of Fair Trading to the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA):
The FCA regime is already having a substantial positive 
impact which is helping to deliver the Government’s vision 
for an effective and sustainable consumer credit market that 
meets consumer needs. However, the FCA is not best placed 
to investigate and enforce certain types of illegal money 
lending such as the type practised by loan sharks 
(HL Deb, 2016).
The UK government, in recognising that the FCA was not best 
placed to investigate and prosecute specific types of illegal 
money lending, principally loan sharking, highlighted the role 
of the Illegal Money Lending Teams in England, Scotland and 
Wales:
Those teams are made up of local trading standards officers 
who accordingly have broader powers than the FCA to 
prosecute the particular criminality that loan sharks are 
involved with, and relevant expertise in educating vulnerable 
consumers. They are also able to draw on geographically 
dispersed community intelligence officers who are crucial 
in identifying localised illegal lenders. The teams work 
alongside the FCA in policing the regulatory perimeter 
specifically to target loan sharks and to provide support and 
advice to the victims of illegal moneylenders. They also help 
educate local communities about the dangers of borrowing 
illegally from loan sharks (HL Deb, 2016).
In order to support the regulatory work of the FCA and the 
investigative remit of the Illegal Money Lending Teams, the 
Bank of England and Financial Services Act 2016 provided 
for funding from the Treasury via a levy on consumer credit 
firms, which is collected by the FCA. In amending the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000, the Bank of England and 
Financial Services Act 2016 (part 20(b) s.333S (2)) provides 
that:
Taking action against illegal money lending includes—
a. investigating illegal money lending and offences connected 
with illegal money lending;
b. prosecuting, or taking other enforcement action in respect 
of, illegal money lending and offences connected with 
illegal money lending;
c. providing education, information and advice about illegal 
money lending, and providing support to victims of illegal 
money lending;
d. undertaking or commissioning research into the 
effectiveness of activities of the kind described in 
paragraphs (a) to (c);
e. providing advice, assistance and support (including 
financial support) to, and oversight of, persons engaged in 
activities of the kind described in paragraphs (a) to (c).
It is important to note, however, that the approach to illegal 
money lending in Northern Ireland is different to other parts 
of the UK. Since 2018, The Consumer Council has been 
funded to provide education and raise awareness of the issues 
surrounding illegal money lending. However, responsibility for 
enforcement remains with the PSNI. It is important to recognise 
that a purely policing approach to tackling loan sharking has 
been argued to ‘dilute the social policy dimensions of the effort 
to combat illegal money lending’ (DTI, 2007, p.7). The role of 
law enforcement, including the context of paramilitary actors 
who may or may not be involved in illegal money lending, is 
considered in light of the findings from this research below. 
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Returning to the judicial impact of the legislative amendments 
in the UK, the operation of a consumer credit business without 
a licence is a criminal offence, carrying a maximum penalty 
of £5,000 and/or up to two years’ imprisonment (Director 
of Public Protection, 2015, p.2). In order to contextualise the 
severity, or rather the lenience of sentences for illegal money 
lending, it is instructive to consider the governmental and 
criminal justice system responses to illegal money lending in 
other jurisdictions. In the Republic of Ireland, illegal money 
lending (that is, offering money lending services without a 
licence) carries a sentence of up to five years’ imprisonment 
and/or a fine of up to €63,486.90 under the Central Bank 
and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Act 2003 (Citizens 
Information). In Japan, there has been a consistent approach 
to increase the maximum sentence for ‘loan sharking’ to three 
years imprisonment in 1983, five years in 2003 and then 
most recently, in 2007, to ten years. Additionally, the potential 
fine for loan sharking has been raised to 30 million yen 
(approximately £206,000):
Prosecutions for illegal lending in Japan were also made 
easier in 2003, since which time evidence of advertising for, 
or directly approaching people in order to offer, loans has 
been sufficient to warrant an arrest (Gibbons, 2012, p.22).
Of particular interest in the Japanese approach is the potential 
civil law recourse for victims to sue the illegal money ender 
for the repayment of all payments connected with their loans 
(Gibbons, 2012, p.22). In 2015, Europol forecasted that the 
continued expansion of organised crime groups into the legal 
economy was a key threat facing Europe (Europol, 2015). In 
Italy, from a legal position, a loan is considered to be usurious 
and illegal if the interest rate applied to the loan is over 50% 
more than the average level as issued quarterly by the Ministry 
of the Treasury.  However, Marinaro (2017, p.203) notes that 
the legal response is overtly focused on the actions of legal 
credit providers and fails to adequately consider the prevalence 
of the ‘distinct informal credit market’ despite providing punitive 
sanctions for unregistered credit brokers: 
While obliquely recognising the particular vulnerability of 
certain actors, the law does not explicitly distinguish between 
a bank that temporarily exceeds the threshold, and a loan-
shark who traps a borrower in a cycle of ever-increasing 
debt (Marinaro, 2017, p.202).
The overarching aim of the anti-usury legislation (Law 108) 
introduced in Italy in 1996 was to ‘fill gaps in the law that 
previously discouraged usury victims from trusting the institutions 
and thus forcing them to renounce seeking justice’ (Busà 
and La Rocca, 2006, p.65). In addition to legal provisions 
regulating thresholds of interest rates above which loans were 
considered as usurious and illegal, the Italian government 
introduced a range of strategies designed to prevent people 
from going to illegal money lenders. One approach was 
the introduction of a Fund for the Prevention of Usury to help 
not-for-profit organisations to conduct public awareness 
campaigns, highlight the dangers of illegal money lending, 
help people burdened with debt restructure their finances, 
and support individuals to report illegal money lenders to the 
relevant authorities. An additional fund was also set up to 
support entrepreneurs who had reported illegal money lenders 
to rebuild or to create new businesses. The fund, entitled the 
Solidarity Fund for Usury Victims (later merged with a fund for 
victims of extortion), could only be accessed by individuals 
who had testified in criminal proceedings against illegal money 
lenders and whose contribution had manifestly contributed 
to a conviction. 
Significantly, the loan can only begin once criminal 
proceedings have started, and if the prosecution is unsuccessful 
the loan can be revoked. Marinaro (2017, p.209) notes that, 
given that victims of extortion do not have to repay comparable 
loans, it is indicative of an underlying narrative of usury victims 
being regarded as, in some way, complicit in crime:
The State appears to make a moral distinction between 
such victims, which it views as innocent, and usury victims 
perceived as complicit in a crime. This fails to reflect both the 
frequent unavoidability of illegal borrowing and the fact that 
by no means are all businesses that pay protection money 
‘innocent’ of complicity (ibid.).
From a macro-level European Union position, the critical 
legislative provision is Directive 2008/48/EC on Credit 
Agreements for Consumers. The overarching aim of the 
Consumer Credit Directive (CCD), as it is more commonly 
referred to, was to harmonise the regulation of consumer credit 
across member states to enhance consumer protection:
In order to facilitate the emergence of a well-functioning 
internal market in consumer credit, it is necessary to 
make provision for a harmonised Community framework 
in a number of core areas. In view of the continuously 
developing market in consumer credit and the increasing 
mobility of European citizens, forward-looking Community 
legislation which is able to adapt to future forms of credit 
and which allows Member States the appropriate degree of 
flexibility in their implementation should help to establish a 
modern body of law on consumer credit (Council Directive 
2008/48/EC, 7).
The implementation of the provisions of the Directive apply 
to legally authorised money lenders and we can extrapolate 
from the conditions imposed on money lenders that illegal 
money lending from a legislative position is regarded as either 
usurious behaviour by legal lenders or lending by unauthorised 
individuals. Indicative of this focus on the actions of legal 
lenders, it is significant that the Council Directive contains no 
reference to the terms illegal money lending or loan sharks.
1.2.2 Policy response to debt
There is no international consensus as to how individual and 
household debt should be tackled (including legal and illegal 
borrowing), and state policies vary depending on culture and 
context (Bouyon and Oliinyk, 2019). In France and Germany, 
there are lower consumer levels of borrowing and debt, interest 
rates on loans are capped, and there are greater restrictions on 
sub-prime lending than in the UK and Ireland (ibid.). Germany 
has a long-established system of detailed credit checks on 
individuals prior to allowing access to loans (Deeming et al., 
2011), while in France the Scrivener law (1978) has promoted 
quality of information for consumers (Deeming et al., 2011). 
It is also compulsory for all adult French citizens to have a 
bank account with an overdraft of 50% of a client’s income to 
improve ‘financial inclusion’ (NICVA, 2013).
Yet such measures restricting the sub-prime market can limit 
access to credit for lower-income groups, and there is a lack of 
evidence as to whether or not such approaches impact upon 
levels of usury or illegal lending (Deeming et al., 2011). While 
the ‘Better Banking’ campaign in the UK called for banks to 
reinvest 1% of their profits into local communities to increase 
‘financial inclusion’,  the campaign also called for a cap 
on interest rates on sub-prime loans (Deeming et al. 2011). 
However, Bouyon and Oliinyk (2019) have cautioned against 
any simplistic application of policies that work in one country 
and context to another, particularly given that in the UK and 
Ireland there is a substantial proportion of the population reliant 
on such forms of short-term credit (see also NICVA, 2013).
Two of the most commonly advocated approaches to dealing 
with debt in the UK and Ireland include, firstly, expanding the 
Credit Union and Community Development Financial Institution 
sector (Jones, 2013); and secondly, providing financial 
education (‘financial literacy’) training on debt, while promoting 
the value of saving and balancing budgets (Mosedale et al., 
2018). In relation to the former, although Northern Ireland has 
much higher levels of Credit Union membership than the rest 
of the UK (38.4% of the population are members compared 
with just 3.3% in Great Britain),  at present only approximately 
4% of Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE) tenants are 
members of Credit Unions (yet those in social housing are 
at greater risk of requiring a sub-prime or illegal loan) 
(Jones, 2013). 
There is also at present ‘little marketing directed at low income 
or financially excluded groups’ in relation to joining a Credit 
Union in Northern Ireland (ibid., p.10). Often, an individual will 
have to be proposed for membership by an existing member 
and/or will have to save a certain amount of money before 
they can apply for a loan. This is unlikely to suffice for someone 
in need of a small amount of cash relatively quickly (Burton, 
2010). Indeed, despite payday loan companies and loan 
sharks being identified as the main competitors of Credit Unions 
in Northern Ireland, it is difficult for them to compete with such 
lenders as not only is it risky and expensive to provide short-
term loans for small amounts of money to those with little or no 
savings, but the interest rate on loans has been capped in Great 
Britain for Credit Unions at 3% per month (42.6% APR), while 
in Northern Ireland it is capped at 1% per month (12.9% APR) 
(see Jones, 2013; Money Advice Service, 2019).
In relation to improving financial literacy to reduce the 
likelihood of unmanageable debt, there are disagreements 
within the literature as to the effectiveness of such approaches. 
Awareness-raising campaigns have been suggested as ways 
of highlighting the potential for those on a low income to join 
a Credit Union as a means of saving and accessing credit 
(NICVA, 2013). But there is also an argument that by placing 
the onus upon the individual in financial distress to educate 
themselves (despite how little they earn), this ignores socio-
economic inequality and the policies of austerity that have 
impacted upon the lives of many people living on low incomes 
in the UK and Ireland (Mosedale et al., 2018).
The most widely espoused means of tackling debt within the 
literature (legal or illegal) is widening access to affordable 
credit for individuals in need (NICVA, 2013), and encouraging 
greater levels of partnership working between government, 
the mainstream banking sector, charities, Credit Unions and 
Community Development Financial Institutions (Deeming et 
al., 2011). Several examples from international contexts are 
cited in this regard. In Australia, a no-interest loan scheme was 
introduced by the Good Shepherd Youth and Family Service 
in the 1970s, which provides loans of between AUS$800–
$1,000 (free of interest and fees) (NICVA, 2013). In France, in 
January 2005 a social cohesion fund was established between 
the government, banks and finance institutions to provide small 
loans (between €300–4,000 repaid over 48 months) for 
those who do not otherwise have access to mainstream credit 
(Deeming et al., 2011).
With the ending of the Social and Growth Funds in the 
UK (which provided emergency loans to those in financial 
distress), the financial difficulties associated with the moves 
towards Universal Credit are likely to be exacerbated for 
many people in receipt of public welfare.  Given that the 
£500 million mitigation package  for those living in poverty in 
Northern Ireland is also due to end by 2021 (NIHRC, 2019), 
consideration must urgently be given to how best to support 
those in debt in Northern Ireland, and particularly those most 
at risk of having to resort to using illegal money lenders or 
loan sharks.
1.2.3 Summary
Illegal money lending is a multifaceted and all-encompassing 
issue facing many individuals and families across the UK 
and beyond. From a definitional perspective, a detailed 
analysis of existing research and policy directives pertaining 
to illegal money lending reveals that there is a distinct and 
nuanced difference between the legislative understanding 
and the practical, lived reality for people within working-class 
communities. Within a legislative and governmental framework, 
illegal money lending is a broad term that encompasses 
associative terms such as ‘usury’, ‘loan sharking’ and 
‘unauthorised lending’ amongst others. Consequently, there is 
both a conflation and a confusion in how these terms are used 
in relation to illegal money lending and generally the terms 
have come to be used interchangeably. Notably, the critical 
correlation between the terms is the divergence from, or 
the disregard for, regulatory rules governing the legal 
lending of money.
From a criminal justice and policing approach, a review of 
the legislation, case-law and approach of the Illegal Money 
Lending Teams across the UK illuminated the interpretation of 
‘loan sharking’ as the charging of extortionate rates of interest 
in a clearly exploitative manner. The key legislative provision 
for prosecuting illegal money lending in the UK is the Bank of 
England and Financial Services Act 2016. The criminal justice 
system construct of illegal money lending is overtly focused on 
lenders that operate without a licence. However, given that the 
failure to maintain repayments to illegal money lenders, or loan 
sharks, often incurs threats of and or use of violence against 
the debtor, it is important to note the capacity for the criminal 
1. Predominantly within the Old Testament, such as Exodus, 22:25; Leviticus: 25: 35–37; and Deuteronomy, 
23:19.
2. A contraction of the Japanese words for ‘salaryman’ and ‘cash’ (see Sterngold, 1993).
3. Sixty-two per cent of this figure of £44 billion is estimated to have come from drug trafficking, particularly 
cocaine (Europol, 2013, p.14)
4. The English word ‘usury’ is derived from the Latin word usura or ‘interest’. However, Goldstock and Coenen 
(1980, p.139) refer to how the terms ‘usury’ and ‘interest’ have changed meaning over time. They note that 
in Roman and Greek law, ‘interest’ tended to mean compensation for damage to the loaner by failure to 
repay; it was only after the establishing of a legal rate of interest did ‘usury’ come to specifically mean an 
exorbitant charge for a loan that exceeds the legal rate of interest. ‘Interest’, in modern parlance, now tends 
to refer to the ‘added rate charged rather than original usage in terms of compensation for damage/harm to 
the individual who loaned the money’ (ibid.). Anatocism refers to ‘the interest on the interest’ of a loan.
5. The term ‘predatory’ is important in the etymology of the term loan shark, given the predatory instincts of 
sharks in the oceanic food chain.
6.  Translation provided by Marinaro (2017, p.203).
7. To compound matters further, another definition is proffered by Savona and Michele (2015, p.81), who link 
‘usury’ to ‘loan sharking and ‘illegal money lending’, and define it as ‘the lending of funds through illegal 
channels at a high interest rate to a person or a company usually in economic difficulties’.
8. Interestingly, Jeff Beck had a Top 30 UK hit in 1967 with a song called ‘Tallyman’, entirely about a prolonged 
‘cradle to grave’ doorstep/debt relationship. The word clearly still had currency in Britain in the 1960s.
9. The usage of pawnshops rapidly declined during this period. 
10. O’Connell notes that, at times, already difficult circumstances were exacerbated by the ‘feckless’ behaviour 
of some men in working-class households in terms of drinking or gambling large parts of their wage away 
before household bills had even been met.
11. According to O’Connell (2009, p.5), ‘in 1960 the average Littlewoods agent had 16 customers. By 1997 
this had fallen to just 2.8 (2 of whom were usually from the same household as the agent).’
12. Northern Ireland has, however, been historically more dependent on the Credit Union sector than the rest of 
the UK. Thus, ‘in the early 1990s, Credit Unions provided 0.1% of all personal loans in UK – but in Northern 
Ireland at that time,  it was 8%’ (O’Connell, 2019, p.10).
13. Thus, ‘The companies who thrive today on their ability to offer loans to low-income families do so because 
of the quasi-monopolistic position that they enjoy with their customers. But they also succeed because their 
service is familiar and convenient for those customers an is based upon face-to-face relationships and 
community networks’ (O’Connell, 2009, p.7).
14. Including those on ‘zero hours’ contracts and those who work in the ‘gig economy’. 
15. Christians Against Poverty found that ‘approximately 75% of their debt advice clients who were in a 
relationship had suffered, including one-quarter whose relationship had ended as a result’ (Mosedale et al., 
2018, p.319).
16. This was prior to FASA ceasing operation in 2016. A number of the services provided by the organisation 
were taken on by EXTERN (see BBC Northern Ireland, 2016). 
17.  The report was based upon a sample of 55,000 households. It identified the average ‘British’ median 
savings at £1,094 (Legal and General, 2012, p.5), although this figure excludes Northern Ireland, which 
tends to be overlooked in the research generally.
18. ‘Financial inclusion’ has been defined by the World Bank as meaning ‘that individuals and businesses have 
access to useful and affordable financial products and services that meet their needs – transactions, pay-
ments, savings, credit and insurance – delivered in a responsible and sustained way’ (World Bank, 2018). 
Those most likely to be ‘financially excluded’ are: women; young people; older people; lone parents/single 
people; those with lower education levels; and those on lower income levels (Deeming et al., 2011).
19. This is also lower than the current unemployment rate in the Republic of Ireland (5.3%) and the EU generally 
(6.6%) (NISRA, 2019, p.1).
20.  The figures correspond to the year 2017/2018 compared with 2016/2017. Anyone or any household 
earning £304 or less per week in 2017/2018 was deemed to be living in poverty; those on £288 were 
deemed to be living in ‘absolute poverty’ (see DfC, 2019b).
21. Long-term unemployed is defined as anyone out of work for one year or more. 
22.  According to the ASDA Income Tracker December 2018: ‘Discretionary income reflects the amount of 
money remaining after the average UK household has had taxes subtracted from their income and bought 
essential items such as: groceries, electricity, gas, transport costs and mortgage payments or rent.’ The 
average discretionary income in Northern Ireland is £109 per week, which is £38 per week lower than the 
North East of England, the next lowest region.
23.  More commonly referred to as the ‘payday loan’ sector, although this is technically erroneous as a ‘pay-
day’ loan is only one form of sub-prime loan. 
24.  However, its contraction in more recent times will be considered before the end of this section. One argu-
ment made in terms of applying sanctions that restrict the sector (such as a cap on interest rates) is that if there 
are fewer legal options, individuals in need of cash quickly may seek out ‘illegal money lenders’ and loan 
sharks if their other options have been restricted (Deeming et al., 2011).
25. But as Bouyon and Oliinyk (2019, p.7) note, ‘even at its peak in 2013, this accounted for only 1.5% of total 
MFI consumer loans’. So, despite the growth in the sector in recent years, it still only accounts for a small 
percentage of the overall UK consumer credit market, estimated to be worth £180 billion (Lawrence and 
Cooke, 2014).
26. For example, ‘QuickQuid’s’ APR is 1,294.1% (see QuickQuid, 2019). However, it has been argued that APR 
is an unfair means of judging ‘payday’ loan value for money, as such figures do not apply for loans that are 
repaid over a much shorter period of time than one year (Mosedale et al., 2018).
27. Both these firms are currently out of business/not accepting new loans and as noted above are representa-
tive of a wider contraction in the sub-prime loan sector that will be discussed later in this report.
28. The individual in question usually needs to be employed.
29. On this point, Lawrence and Cooke (2014, p.12) note that ‘nearly half of all payday loan users said they 
took one out as they could not access other forms of credit’.
30. As Mosedale et al. (2018, p.319) point out: ‘Banks generally do not provide the sort of small, short-term 
loans poorer people typically need at short notice.’
31. One research study found that ‘the most common reason to take out a ‘payday’ loan was to pay for living 
expenses (41%); followed by household emergencies (35%); then utility bills (32%). Mortgage or rent was 
also cited by a significant minority’ (Lawrence and Cooke, 2014, p.16).
32. However, it has been suggested that most users of ‘payday’ loans in the UK come from the north-east of 
England and Scotland; not the south-west of England and London (Burton, 2010). This report does not 
mention Northern Ireland in this regard, although one would assume that given the socio-economic and 
cultural conditions are closer to those of the north-east of England and Scotland than the south-west of 
England, higher levels of ‘payday’ loan usage are likely to be experienced within some communities in 
Northern Ireland.
33. This contrasts with the situation in the United States, where borrowers tend to be older, and with children 
(see Burton, 2010): ‘In the US adults without bank accounts and those with impaired credit histories make 
extensive use of payday loans. In the UK, this is not the case. While 67% of payday loan borrowers in the 
UK have an income of below £25,000, this is lower than in the USA, where it is closer to 75%’ (ibid., p.5).
34.  According to Lawrence and Cooke (2014), in June 2013, the Office for Fair Trading (OFT) referred the entire 
sub-prime lending sector to the Competition Commission as 90% of lenders were found to be non-compliant 
with OFT guidelines. The study suggests that more than 25% of lenders did not conduct affordability checks, 
while approximately one third of loans were ‘rolled over’. These ‘roll over’ loans accounted for almost half of 
all sub-prime organisational revenues.
35. NICVA (2013) suggested that a Trading Standards survey in Northern Ireland revealed that of 29 loan 
companies, the majority did not adequately explain to borrowers the consequences of their failure to repay 
the loan on time. The survey also revealed that many lenders were unable to quote their APR rates, which 
was in direct contravention of consumer legislation. 
36. Interest rates tend to be high, not only due to the risk of clients defaulting on payment, but also because the 
staffing and administrative costs of administering relatively small loans over a short period of time leads to 
small profit margins on individual loans. Unfortunately, the lucrative aspect of the sub-prime loans business 
is in either securing a high volume of customers taking out loans, or in loans that continue to ‘roll over’ and 
accrue interest and additional charges (Bouyon and Oliinyk, 2019). Indeed, Bouyon and Oliinyk further 
suggest that for an average loan of £327, a sub-prime lender requires the client to take out and repay three 
loans to ‘break even’ and recover the costs of advertising and administration.
37. In another cross-European study of criminal networks and activity, only ten studies were identified on ‘usury’, 
nine of which related to Italy (see Savona and Michele, 2015).
38. The report continued by stating that turning to loan sharks is ‘The option of last resort in ‘pockets of depriva-
tion’ – but this is anecdotal’.
39. Malcolm and Curtin, (1968, p.766) refer to the ‘vigorous’ (or vig), which is the ‘underworld term for interest 
and other charges imposed on a loan’. 
40. Using one example, Goldstock and Coenen (1980, p.133) comment: ‘The gambling in the plant – mainly 
on sports – had been taken over by a Mafia mobster. Over a month John X overextended himself and lost 
much more than he could afford. The underworld character was willing to loan him $100 but John X would 
have to pay back $125 at the end of the week. He couldn’t. Another loan. The debt grew. The threats came. 
Two musclemen visited X’s home at dinnertime. They threatened X’s wife and children. The next day an envoy 
from the mobster met him with a smile. ‘Everything will be considered square,’ he said, if X would finger the 
next shipment of television sets. X was so frightened he did it. The hijacking misfired and X was arrested.’
41. In the words of a former loan shark: ‘People who borrow from a juice operation do so only because they 
really need it after they have been frozen out of other sources for money. They mostly figure that the only 
time you can get a bank to loan you money is when you prove you don’t need it’ (Goldstock and Coenen, 
1980, pp.137–138).
42. They suggest there is, however, huge variation on the APR applied by different loan sharks depending on 
several factors, including the size of the loan and the status of the ‘client’. APR rates can vary from between 
52–1,000% APR.
43. From an Italian perspective, it is instructive to note that rather than individuals borrowing for private personal 
or familial reasons, often business people avail of the services of illegal money lenders to finance their 
businesses (Marinaro, 2017).
44. This does not mean that these authors are suggesting the paramilitary organisations are not involved in these 
practices – rather, that the terms ‘extortion’ and ‘racketeering’ are used as ‘catch-all’ terms to include this 
form of activity, without necessarily providing any specific detail on it. 
45. Operations Waggel, Microscopal and Midwifery were a part of the Paramilitary Crime Task Force (PCTF) 
Operation MOILE. The PCTF is a joint taskforce created to target crime by paramilitary groups (see NIO, 
2015; NCA, 2018).
46. The Financial Inclusion Centre (FIC) has provided estimates to suggest that the usage of illegal loan sharking 
may have risen by 22% between 2006–2010; however, it is very difficult to corroborate this statistic given 
the general lack of evidence (see, NICVA, 2013, p.2; FIC, 2010).
47. Similarly, a recent submission by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission to the UN Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women referred to a rise in loan sharking as a result of 2010 social 
security reforms, which have resulted in ‘Northern Ireland women … turning to paramilitary-operated illegal 
lending’ (NIHCRC, 2019, pp.34–35), although, in making this statement, the report references previous 
desk-based work such as the NICVA (2013) report rather than any empirical data.
48. The 2007/2008 financial crisis resulted in the UK suffering the deepest recession since the Second World 
War. Some financial markets were effectively closed and others were so badly damaged that businesses 
and households were unable to secure the finance they needed (see Bank of England, 2019).
49. See Del-Río and Young (2005) on the impact of debt generally on mental health and stress.
50.  See Bermeo (2017) on the gendered dynamic of home credit.
51.  The report notes that: ‘Illegal lending generally occurs in close-knit, closed communities and lenders are of-
ten well known, with business built up through social networking. Most relationships between illegal lenders 
and their customers are based on fear and intimidation with lenders seeking to control their customers with a 
range of coercive practices. Intimidation and violence ensure that payments to lenders are prioritised while 
protecting lenders from reporting. Control is further reinforced by the taking of illegal securities, particularly 
those that control access to victims’ income, such as benefit books and cash cards. Non-payment can result 
in some borrowers becoming enmeshed in sexual exploitation and criminal activities, including drug dealing 
and prostitution’ (DTI, 2007, p.17).
52. Assets and money recovered by Illegal Money Lending Teams in the UK is utilised for a range projects 
including designing educational resources for schools to warn young people of the dangers of loan sharking 
(see Birmingham City Council, 2019).
53. The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 Amendment (Scotland) Order 2011 (No.231) (sch.4(e)). The Consumer 
Credit Act 1974 (c.39) was significantly amended by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Reg-
ulated Activities) (Amendment) (No.2) Order 2013. Indeed, section 39(1) has now been omitted from the 
Consumer Credit Act 1974 by the 2000 Act.
54. Consumer Credit Act 1974 (c.39) s.189(1).
55. R v Dowse [2017] EWCA Crim. 598 at 215.
56. R v Greaves [2011] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.)8, p.72.
57. Law 108 of 1996, Anti-Usury Legislation. See Marinaro (2017, p.203).
58. Lane and Rodrigues (2015) suggest that mainstream banks could have done much more to support those 
relying upon sub-prime loans.
59. See Consumer Council (2018). There are at least 460,000 members of Credit Unions in Northern Ireland 
with 90,000 junior savers. Credit Unions in 2013 held £942 million in savings and made loans of £522 
million (see Jones, 2013, p.10).
60. This is particularly the case since many staff implementing the new Universal Credit payments system appear 
unaware that claimants must continue to apply for split payments in person until the end of the review of the 
payment system in 2023 (NIHRC, 2019, p.35).
61. Mitigation measures were put in place in response to the potential effects of welfare reform through a system 
of supplementary welfare payments by A Fresh Start: the Stormont Agreement and Implementation Plan, an 
agreement by the Northern Ireland Assembly (see NIO, 2015).
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justice system to utilise legislation, such as the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002 or the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, 
concomitantly with the aforementioned Financial Services Act 
2016.
In order to fully comprehend the complexity of illegal money 
lending, it is important to understand the socio-economic, 
historical and cultural context in which such lending occurs. 
Moving beyond a linear legalistic or economic-based definition 
of illegal money lending, the review of the literature highlighted 
the social impact of debt and money lending. Illegal money 
lending is not a uniquely contemporary phenomenon; rather, it 
has been an intrinsic part of many working-class communities 
for generations. It has become a sociocultural pillar for many 
people on low incomes as a normalised means of accessing 
additional and alternative forms of credit. Although there is 
no single reason why people use illegal money lenders, some 
of the primary reasons suggested within the literature are as 
follows:
• Consumers have exhausted all available legal sources of 
credit (they are deemed too ‘high risk’ or the amount of 
money they require is too small to meet the threshold for a 
loan from a bank/building society);
• Consumers are unaware of their eligibility for accessing 
resources through legal money lending organisations;
• A sudden and unexpected change in circumstances 
necessitating quick and convenient money;
• A change in personal circumstances due to the death of a 
loved one, loss of earnings due to ill-health, addiction, or 
difficult/abusive domestic relationships;
• Individuals view using illegal money lenders as a relatively 
‘normal’ interaction within their community;
• ‘Vulnerable’ individuals, usually on low incomes with few 
alternatives, are targeted and exploited by opportunistic 
illegal money lenders.
The literature review has identified that illegal money lending 
is a significant problem in many communities across the 
UK and further afield. It is perhaps its embeddedness as a 
sociocultural norm within communities, combined with persisting 
socio-economic inequalities, that significantly contributes to 
its prevalence as a community resource, and to the difficulty 
in combatting it from a criminal justice and policy perspective. 
The literature points to a correlation between illegal money 
lending and OCGs (such as paramilitaries in the Northern Irish 
context); however, there is a general lack of reliable data as 
to the extent, scale and impact of their involvement. Much of 
the evidence is often anecdotal and refers to the fear of victims, 
or explicit threats being made to debtors upon their inability to 
maintain repayments on loans taken out at extortionate rates, 
when they are in most financial need.
Glossary
24 25
Illegal money lending & debt project Consumer Council
2.1.1 Definitions
From the interviews and focus group with key stakeholders it 
was evident that illegal lending is a complex and multifaceted 
issue, with research participants providing a range of definitions 
of the problem.
Most of those interviewed focused on the difference between 
formal (regulated) lending and informal (unregulated lending) 
with informal lending described as unregistered lending 
from one person to another outside of the controls of the 
Financial Conduct Authority. Most were happy to refer to 
such practices as illegal money lending although other terms 
such as ‘loan sharking’ and ‘unauthorised lending’ were used 
interchangeably and led to an impression across the research 
team that respondents were unconcerned by the label assigned 
to it as long as the practice met the core description of having 
occurred outside of the regulatory rules governing the legal 
lending of money (FCA, 2017, para. 1.1.). Interestingly, this 
placed other forms of doorstep lending outside of the definition 
of illegal activity; however, in practice, when dealing with 
problematic lending practices, this form of lending was still 
described as being a major issue by the research participants. 
Respondents also referenced the interest rates charged by 
lenders as being a key factor in identifying the legitimacy or 
illegality of lending. This centred on the charging of high or 
even extortionate rates, operating without a cap on interest 
rates, or being able to change the terms and conditions, 
including the interest rates, during the loan period. 
Instead of focusing too much on formal legislation and legal 
definitions, several respondents referred to the characteristics 
of the consumer, normally from working-class districts, and 
the means employed to ensure they complied with the terms 
of the loan, including coercive measures such as violence 
and intimidation, as being central to their conception 
of illegal lending:
2. Illegal Money Lending Project 
– Findings and Discussion
For me, the illegal lending of money is something which 
occurs primarily in working-class areas, for extortionate 
interest rates. The threat of violence for non-payment 
underpins the agreement. (Focus Group) 
There needs to be enforcers involved, otherwise the debt 
has no weight. In one case, a neighbour owed money. 
Then his son turned up and asked for the cash and it was a 
neighbour. It may also not be fully presented to us by clients: 
owed to ‘a family friend’ for the client might be understood 
as paramilitaries outside. In some areas they may not be 
telling us. (Int. 4) 
From such a perspective, Northern Ireland was described as 
being potentially unique as the history of violent conflict and the 
ways in which it has defined relationships within communities 
has ensured a complexity and nuance in money-lending 
practices that ensure that it cannot be compared easily with 
the rest of the UK. This will be explored further in terms of the 
characteristics of the lenders and those accessing their services. 
2.1.2 Who are the illegal lenders?
Respondents sorted those involved in illegal money lending 
into two broad groups: paramilitaries and ‘regular’ members 
of the community. However, in practice, the identification 
of those involved was far more difficult, with no consistent 
clarity as to the characteristics, affiliation and legitimacy of 
such people. Two common identifiers were evident, however. 
Firstly, the money lender has to have some form of local 
influence or legitimacy. In Northern Ireland’s post-conflict 
landscape, this influence has tended to come from paramilitary 
groups, although this was often quite nuanced in terms of 
whether it was direct participation or through an indirect 
form of affiliation or assigned authority. When set against the 
complex local, geographical and cultural context of Northern 
Ireland, it became increasingly difficult to separate the issue 
2.1 Core characteristics of illegal money lending in Northern Ireland
A principal task for this research was to probe the current nature of illegal money lending 
in Northern Ireland by drawing upon the knowledge and experiences of key stakeholders 
working in the types of sectors where illegal lending could be causing identified problems 
within their day to day operations. The research team focused first of all on the concept and 
definitions of illegal lending before attempting to build a picture of the lenders and those who 
access their services. These will each be looked at in turn.
of paramilitarism from the broader illegal economy. Because 
of their pervasive influence in some areas, many believed 
that paramilitaries were certainly heavily involved, though not 
necessarily directly organising lending themselves:
There are often strong connections between lenders and 
paramilitaries. In some circumstances, the paramilitaries 
could be the direct lenders for the profit of the organisation; 
in others circumstances, it could be individual members 
of paramilitary groups lending for their own profit; and in 
other circumstances, it could be lenders with connections / 
support from paramilitaries, with no direct affiliation to them. 
For example, there was an elderly woman lender in one 
community who carried out all the lending. (Focus Group) 
Most of the cases we are seeing involve paramilitaries 
or there is a paramilitary somewhere in the background 
providing legitimacy for the lender to operate. (Int. 6)
They [illegal money lenders] are generally found in very 
low-income areas or areas of high deprivation. There is 
usually paramilitary or organised crime gangs influencing or 
controlling the flow of the money into the market. (Int. 13)
We have also seen cases where the lender was not 
associated with paramilitaries but was claiming that he was. 
Paramilitary involvement can involve direct lending or as a 
tax on someone to operate in their area and avail of their 
ability to intimidate those who are not paying back debt. 
(Int. 15)
There is no way illegal money lending is not going on. 
Coercive control of areas means that nothing happens, 
including enforcement, without paramilitary knowledge. But 
illegal lending goes back further than paramilitaries. Informal 
systems have always occurred, so rather than being invented 
they are tolerated as part of normal. (Int. 4)
However, it was also frequently argued that the involvement 
of paramilitaries was much more indirect or ambiguous, with 
Illegal money lending often being carried out directly by well-
known community members operating without any internal 
organisational control:
I expected it [links between illegal money lending and 
paramilitarism] to be in all the towns. But it turned out not to 
be the case. In Carrickfergus, Larne and Newtownabbey this 
issue is raised. But not so much in similar places elsewhere, 
like Portadown and Newtownards. (Int. 4) 
Paramilitaries are involved in all of it – community 
development, drugs, money lending the lot. Does that mean 
that all money lending is paramilitary? – no. Does that mean 
that money lending is a paramilitary programme? – no. 
(Int. 5) 
Paramilitaries need to be stopped, but it is also the ordinary 
people on the street doing it. Everyone knows who they are. 
Everyone knows their rates. There are always connections 
between these independent people and paramilitaries. 
(Int. 3)
In certain areas, they would be paramilitary-related. This 
would be more urban areas. In rural areas, it would be more 
someone who had a family that has influence in this area. 
But it is very difficult to get a scale of the problem. There is 
a sense that some [paramilitaries] are doing it directly and 
others are merely taxing those lending money in the area 
they control. (Int. 9)
Not necessarily paramilitaries but more of a prominent figure 
in the community who goes to your wedding and your kid’s 
christening, part of your family almost. (Int. 7)
The system of financing is opaque. Is the money lender in an 
armed group? Or is it a known person? Are they enriching 
themselves or the organisation? (Int. 4)
Secondly, the lender had to have the ability to carry out 
enforcement measures to recoup the debt or find some other 
means with which to settle it, such as coercing someone to help 
facilitate criminal activity.
For all of these transactions/lenders to be successful there 
had to be some legitimate threat of violence. (Focus Group)
This is about adding legitimacy to the role of criminal gangs 
– they use illegal money lending as a way of establishing a 
role in their community as well as showing their strength. 
(Int. 1)
From the experiences of the participants, it is local 
paramilitaries or subsidiaries that have it all sewn up. Or they 
have levied a debt on someone for an action or a perceived 
action, i.e. you owe us a debt for doing this. It can be a non-
financial solution, e.g. leaving a door open somewhere. 
(Int. 13)
Several of those interviewed noted that illegal lending was also 
taking place from within minority ethnic communities including 
Chinese and Eastern European populations. Commonly, illegal 
lending transactions only occurred ‘within’ the community with 
little or no cross-pollination.
It was explained that links to paramilitary organisations were 
either minimal or non-existent in such communities, with illegal 
money lending and the associated problematic debt tending 
to be associated with gangs engaged in other illegal activities 
such as unregulated gambling, immigration offences including 
human trafficking, and the drugs trade:
Not clear evidence, but reading between the lines I suspect 
that it is big problem in Polish and Romanian communities 
where the close-knit nature of these cultures and fear of 
reprisals by prominent people ensures they do not seek help. 
(Int. 9)
In the Chinese community it tends to be most serious with 
respect to backroom casinos, where people can lose 
their car, their deeds to their restaurant – I even heard of 
one case where a local person lost £115,000 in just one 
evening. (Int. 8)
As one respondent proposed, the close-knit nature of these 
cultural groups and a tradition of not talking to outsiders 
ensured that they were effective in hiding such practices: 
A common theme is that they are in this together so if 
something happens, they close ranks. One gang is universal; 
hence, there are no turf wars attracting bad publicity. They 
are a small close-knit community, so the police or those 
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outside of the community will never hear about it. There are 
big fears of reprisals from OC gangs for going to the police. 
(Int. 8)
The link between illegal lending and other crimes was also a 
core characteristic in local communities, with a particular issue 
being the trade in drugs. Many respondents reflected on the link 
between drugs and debt, with young men in particular at risk of 
falling into debt from borrowing money to purchase drugs:
They [young men] often lived in the short term, borrowing 
money to buy drugs, in some circumstances with no intention 
of paying the money back. This could lead to violent 
retributions or potential recruitment into selling drugs to pay 
back their debts or even being recruited for paramilitary 
activity. (Focus Group) 
It’s all to do with drugs. Feeding their habit. The lenders may 
say, ‘Instead of giving you money, I can give you a lend of 
coke’, then they sell the coke to get their money. But because 
they are addicts, they take the coke themselves and then are 
in more debt. It then increases and increases. (Int. 3) 
Drugs are often the starting point for debt based on the ‘on-
tick’ system. One client started taking drugs in prison – we 
saw him in for over a decade trying to deal with his debts. 
The paramilitaries use such debts to recruit people into the 
practice of drug dealing on their behalf. (Int. 6) 
It’s more about someone was supposed to sell x amount of 
drugs for x amount of money and [they] end up taking them 
or losing them and [are] then asked for the money. When 
they can’t pay, they are placed under threat. (Int. 12)
[With] larger debts, it is usually someone has been caught 
with a large amount of drugs and then the debt falls on them. 
You have to make up the loss. (Int. 13)
In summary, it would appear that paramilitary groups have 
played and continue to play an important role in facilitating 
or profiting from illegal money lending; however, the nature 
of their involvement and the activities underpinning the debt 
can vary greatly across a range of cultural and geographical 
contexts, ensuring difficulty in applying any one definition to 
such a broad range of activities. The next section focuses more 
on those who borrow from illegal money lenders, considering 
a number of important factors and vulnerabilities that appear to 
be key in the appeal of illegal money lending, which together 
can give a sense of its prevalence.
2.1.3 Difficulties assessing the 
prevalence of illegal money lending
Gauging the true extent of illegal money lending in Northern 
Ireland has historically been a difficult process. Those operating 
in the law enforcement and citizen advocacy fields have 
frequently reported either a lack of evidence or highly varied 
accounts of its prevalence. However, a number of themes 
emerged during the research that go some way towards 
explaining why information has been so difficult to uncover, and 
shedding more light on its prevalence.
Firstly, almost every organisation and individual interviewed 
referenced the hidden nature of illegal money lending: 
We looked into it with [our] own research and found that it is 
hidden. People are not disclosing to advisors at all or are just 
lying and saying their debt is from another form of funding. 
(Anon)
When pressed, respondents agreed that two factors in 
particular were contributing to members of the public’s 
unwillingness to share their experiences with citizen advisors or 
the police: fear and embarrassment. Beginning with the former, 
it was noted that within Northern Ireland there continues to be a 
reluctance within many communities to speak to the authorities 
due to fears that an individual doing so could be labelled an 
informer and invite reprisals. 
It is predominantly due to fear. They are scared that if an 
advisor finds out the source of their debt, they will take action 
(this is not true by the way), causing the victim to be labelled 
a tout in their local community, placing them and their 
families at risk. This is especially the case when paramilitaries 
are involved. (Anon)
Those actively involved in advising members of the public also 
speculated that their clients may be hiding the true source of 
their debt due to embarrassment that they have had to resort to 
such lending in the first place. This was particularly problematic 
as vague or untrue information ensured that advisors were 
unable to negotiate with lenders in the normal way, in order to 
secure a freeze in charges and interest or to negotiate a more 
realistic repayment schedule. It is vital that they find ways to 
encourage people with these issues to open up: 
It is only when you work with people for a period of time 
and build up a relationship that they then may say, ‘I owe 
money to a money lender, he is putting pressure on me and 
my family, you know, a threat has been made, my door has 
been kicked in’ etc. People may open up about it because 
their back is to the wall. (Int. 13)
As members of the public who are accessing the services of 
illegal money lenders are not always sharing their experiences, 
advocacy groups, community organisations and law 
enforcement agencies have had to become adept at spotting 
both the symptoms and the vulnerabilities that may indicate that 
members of the public have a problem.
2.1.4 Vulnerability and the symptoms 
of lending
For many of those interviewed, the reasons that people 
borrowed from illegal lenders were related to a range of 
vulnerabilities including poverty-related issues, such as 
paying for gas / heating / electricity, etc. or purchasing 
necessities such as food / clothes, with the problem having 
been exacerbated in recent times by the economic downturn 
and changes to the benefits system brought about by austerity. 
Several respondents described a situation where the areas 
they service have become increasingly deprived with a lack of 
well-paid work, ensuring that people have become dependent 
on lending to supplement their household incomes. As one 
interviewee explained:
There are times – for example, when kids are going back 
to school, Christmas, Easter – that are all pressure points. If 
you cannot go to legitimate sources you go to illegal ones. 
And they will be like, ‘Och, sure there’s another £150 that 
will tide you over’, give you extra. But they are still charging 
interest on that. They do not let you off the hook once they 
know you can’t pay back the loan. (Int. 13)
Universal Credit was repeatedly described as a driver for 
illegal lending, with the changeover from the previous benefits 
system of Income Support frequently creating problems for 
members of the public. In particular, citizen advocacy groups 
spoke frequently about the harm caused by the four- to five-
week waiting times and issues with short-term benefits loans 
that were then repaid from future benefits, ensuring that benefit 
claimants were always short of the funds they needed to 
support their household, leading them to look to other means of 
getting the money they needed: 
Universal Credit is a big issue. See, if you were on Income 
Support and you were switching over to UC it can be 
straightforward and take four to five weeks. But if you have 
a change of circumstances, they bring you back to the very 
start. Then they lend you money, but then take it out of your 
money when you finally get it. You do not really benefit from 
it. (Int. 3)
Austerity and welfare reform has led to a need for desperate 
people seeking out illegal lending. The introduction of the 
five-week waiting period ensured that we saw desperate 
mothers who, needing to feed their kids, borrowed £500 
[and] when they couldn’t pay a week later, they were lent 
£1,000 and only given £500 again. (Int. 6) 
Universal Credit, there is a five-week wait before you get 
your first payment. Yes, you can apply for UC in advance of 
getting out, but that will be used up in a few days because 
they will be repaying friends and family. That money will not 
last five weeks until the first payday. (Int. 13)
It was noted repeatedly that the reliance on illegal money 
lending to pay for such basic amenities could result in 
borrowers being stuck in a never-ending money-lending cycle 
where people accessing the illegal lending were losing track of 
what they owed and subsequently what they would have to pay 
back, with lenders charging interest inconsistently, often based 
on the circumstances of the borrower and their ability to 
pay back: 
They borrow money each week to get them through to the 
next week and then have to do this every week, but in most 
circumstances the transactions / agreements were not based 
upon mathematical equations or percentages and were 
more arbitrary in nature. For example, if you borrow 50 you 
pay back 70. (Focus Group) 
It is extortion, there is too much of it, it is happening every 
day in deprived areas, people taking advantage of each 
other. I know people that put 100% interest on it. You get 
£200, you pay £400 back. (Int. 3)
For many of these young men this could have negative 
implications for their families. Their mother may have paid 
initially, then got herself into debt, and then a vicious cycle 
emerged. (Focus Group)
People are desperate to get the money, but they quickly lose 
any sense of how much they need to pay back and when. 
(Int. 6) 
Although hidden, several of those interviewed described how 
they had come across evidence of a coercive power dynamic 
between lender and borrower, including the use of violence 
or intimidation, signs of overt poverty due to an inability 
to purchase goods and utilities, or the pawning or seizure 
of possessions:
What happened in some areas was that doorstep lenders 
became bailiffs, walking into a house and saying, ‘Can you 
pay? Okay, you can’t, I’ll take this flat-screen TV then.’ (Int. 
6)
Signs of intimidation are the main symptom – people 
reporting being under threat but not saying why. (Int. 6)
But if you borrow and can’t pay, the responsibility shifts to 
your family, your wife and kids and your parents and other 
extended family. They will come and ransack your house or 
carry out other methods to increase the pressure. (Int. 8)
Normally, a family member or a community rep are 
reporting rather than a direct victim. Anecdotally, people 
will be subject to threats, intimidation, fear for their personal 
safety. We are finding a lot of benefits books or bank cards 
when searching houses for other OC activities. (Int. 7)
When one of the food banks decided to deliver a parcel 
to a family rather than have them collect it, they found the 
house had no heat, light or hot water, having been cut off 
due to unpaid bills. It turned out their son had run up large 
debts with paramilitaries and had then fled the community, 
leaving his parents to pay. (Int. 14)
However, for others, violence and intimidation was not 
something they saw a lot of in their roles: 
Ninety per cent of illegal lending transactions do not incur 
retribution. This provides the lenders with some degree of 
legitimacy within communities. (Int. 11)
We have also not seen any evidence of reprisals for those 
who have not been able to pay their debt. (Int. 9)
The topic of coercion and intimidation was discussed at length 
in the stakeholder focus group, with those present reflecting on 
the role of paramilitary groups. In this regard, the connection 
between the loan and the retribution for non-payment 
was crucial. The loan created a coercive power dynamic 
between the lender and borrower. However, the enforcement 
mechanisms or retributions for non-repayment were again 
arbitrary and subjective. It was noted that for young men 
who did not pay, it was common for violent repercussions; for 
women / the elderly, the lender might turn up at their place of 
work, or wait at the Post Office on the day their benefits are 
received, or even maintain possession of their Post Office cards. 
This was referred to as part of the PR of being a money lender. 
You had to keep the community on your side. In a community, 
there was a consensus that violent punishment was acceptable 
for young men, but not for other demographics. In a similar 
vein, the lenders may make exceptions for people who were 
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in abject poverty – for example, the person who was able to 
prove all the food in their house was from a food bank. When 
stories similar to this circulated in communities, they reinforced 
the communal support for the illegal lenders. 
However, other respondents noted that this was a balancing act 
for the paramilitaries as it was imperative that they were not be 
seen as weak, ensuring they must pursue whoever they can to 
get their money:
For some, the only hope is to ‘settle’ the debt. They ask the 
paramilitaries how much it would take for them to go away. 
In one case, a client had just received his pension after ten 
years of debts. They quoted him 35K and he cashed in his 
pension to be free of them. It was likely he only borrowed a 
small fraction of this. (Int. 6)
With such pressure to pay being exerted on member of the 
public and the underlying difficulties of having to ‘make do’, it 
was unsurprising that mental health was an issue that was raised 
repeatedly with respondents keen to make the connection 
between illegal money lending and a range of problems 
including stress, well-being and even suicide: 
Mental health problems and suicide linked to pressures 
of needing to pay back these debts. Attempts to receive 
discretionary benefits [are] another symptom, normally for a 
fabricated or side issue when the money is really needed to 
pay the lenders. (Int. 6)
People come to us that are stressed and worried. It impacts 
their mental health. Mental health is clearly linked to your 
socio-economic environment, so illegal money lending will 
always come back to us. Financial stress, Universal Credit, 
in debt already. Financial debt and mental health are 
interlinked and intertwined. (Int. 3)
Financial stress not only impacts yourself, it impacts how you 
are going to be eating, things that you can do, impacts your 
kids’ lives, impacts the activities that they can do, if they can 
afford to do afterschool activities, play a musical instrument. 
That is going to have an impact, and it may have an impact 
on your mental health. (Int. 3)
In summary, it is evident that the illegal lending of money is not 
a single phenomenon, but is a complex and multifaceted issue 
that interacts with a variety of poverty and political issues in a 
context where legal money lending is often seen as punitive. 
Although complex and locally variable in nature, it appears 
to be happening in a variety of communities across Northern 
Ireland, with real consequences for those affected. The next 
section considers the work currently being done to prevent 
illegal money lending and combat its worst effects. 
2.2 Policy and prevention
Throughout the research process the research team heard 
countless examples of good practice in responding to illegal 
money lending, but we also heard of a series of issues that 
were hampering effective law enforcement and policy 
responses. In the following sections we explore the 
main approaches to combatting this problem and make 
recommendations for ways in which service delivery and 
enforcement can be improved, if the necessary support is 
provided to hard-pressed organisations.
2.2.1 Law enforcement – issues of 
resources, evidence, specialisation 
and prioritising
In England, Scotland and Wales, official Illegal Money Lending 
Teams have been operating since 2004 to tackle the practice 
of illegal money lending. They adopt a multi-agency approach 
and the teams consist of seconded police officers, financial 
investigators, victim support services and intelligence and phone 
forensic experts. However, as mentioned above, Northern 
Ireland differs from the rest of the UK as it does not have a 
dedicated Illegal Money Lending Team. Instead, The Consumer 
Council are funded to provide education and awareness 
raising, and the PSNI are responsible for enforcement. Across 
both elements of data collection there was a general consensus 
amongst participants that the PSNI should have the principal 
responsibility in tackling illegal lending within communities in 
Northern Ireland. However, they suggested that due to a range 
of impediments, including restricted resourcing, illegal lending 
was a low priority for the PSNI:
There is a general belief that the police are not concerned 
about the illegal money lending transactions within 
communities, unless there were direct and transparent links 
to paramilitaries and / or organised criminal enterprises. 
(Focus Group.)
It is not a big crime. They [PSNI] do not get the resources for 
it … they turn a blind eye to that and small-level drug deals 
... they are not interested in the smaller issues, such as money 
lending or fake goods, but that is wrong. It is these smaller 
endeavours which fuel the organisations. (Int. 3)
While there was a consensus that tackling illegal money 
lending may have been low on the PSNI’s list of priorities, 
some respondents understood the police’s role in tackling 
paramilitarism as a whole. Their duty was to close down 
paramilitaries in all their activities, not just focusing on money 
lending, which is smaller in scale. However, some respondents 
felt that focusing on the connections between illegal lending 
and paramilitaries neglected the complexity of the issue:
Our experience is that the PSNI response is based on 
their paramilitary task force, but the problem is a lot more 
complicated than that. It is not just paramilitary groups, there 
are lots of local OC groups and local community lending 
operatives. (Int. 7)
Outside PSNI resourcing, other impediments facing the police 
were discussed, and many respondents suggested that the 
complexity of illegal money lending transactions meant that it 
was difficult to prosecute individual lenders:
From the PSNI perspective, the lead is from the Paramilitary 
Crime Task Force; therefore, the PSNI are more likely to 
investigate the individual as opposed to the particular type 
of crime. It is extremely difficult to get prosecutions on money 
lending alone, but it can form part of a larger investigation. 
(Int. 1)
Indeed, other participants discussed how the secretive nature 
of the transactions (see above) ensured that participants 
would only come to the police as a last resort. The reason 
for this was often two-fold: firstly, there was an initial stigma 
surrounding being in debt and a feeling of embarrassment that 
accompanied it; and secondly, there was a fear of reprisal 
from the lender, who may have connections to paramilitary 
organisations. They suggested that this secrecy would also 
impact PSNI investigations:
PSNI have their hands tied. They are not going to get a 
statement or other evidence. Clients won’t even tell an 
advisor never mind the police. If someone spoke to the 
police, they and their family would have to move, effectively. 
Why would they? Big police operations on organised 
gangs are great but are not going to work for all these small 
lenders and dealers in close knit communities. (Int. 6)
PSNI should do more, but … the community do not report 
issues with illegal lending and debt, so the police are not 
interested or encouraged. (Int. 8)
As a result of the range of impediments facing the PSNI, some 
respondents suggested that there was a need for a more formal 
task force that would specialise in the area and therefore be 
better equipped to recognise where problems were occurring 
and respond effectively:
The big recommendation from us is that the PSNI need to 
have a dedicated money lending team here in Northern 
Ireland that is modelled on the teams in the rest of the UK 
and does similar work. This team would quickly get a true 
sense of the problem. (Int. 7)
We hear of log book lenders, where members of the public 
have had to secure their debt with the log book of their car 
… But the PSNI would look at the log book and see the 
name of the lender, not the borrower, and support the lender 
despite the illegality of the activity they are engaging in. That 
is where specialist police are needed. (Int. 7)
It is evident throughout discussions with research 
participants that there was a range of impediments 
facing the investigation of illegal money lending 
within Northern Ireland (more will be discussed in the 
next section). This research suggests that the focus on 
paramilitarism means that illegal money lending in 
Northern Ireland is not identified as a specific crime 
target and its nature is over-simplified.
A working group should be established between the 
main agencies with a stake in policing and prevention 
of illegal money lending in Northern Ireland, including 
The Consumer Council, PSNI, local councils, Trading 
Standards, HMRC and the National Crime Agency. The 
working group would:
• Consider the findings of this scoping exercise and other 
relevant research, as well as identify emerging gaps and 
issues. 
• Agree practical inter-agency operational responses to illegal 
money lending and consider the relevance of good practice 
from other jurisdictions.
• Establish a coordinated approach to illegal money lending 
in Northern Ireland including enhanced support for victims, 
comprehensive advice and education in communities and 
appropriate support for all those affected by debt and 
its consequences.
2.2.2 Overcoming cultural and 
historical impediments
In this section, we will discuss the historical social and cultural 
norm of illegal money lending in Northern Ireland. A number of 
respondents, in both the interviews and focus group, alluded to 
the cultural nature of illegal lending within certain communities 
in Northern Ireland. It was suggested that there was ‘a culture 
of borrowing within Northern Ireland as a whole’ (Focus 
Group). This belief is supported by some of the findings from the 
literature review, which identified that: Northern Ireland has the 
lowest proportion of citizens with savings of over £100 within 
the UK; an estimated 10–13% of adults in Northern Ireland 
are ‘unbanked’ and do not have access to a bank account; 
the average personal loan each adult in Northern Ireland has 
amounts to £1,109, compared to £745 in GB; 16% of the 
population in Northern Ireland, and 19% of children, continue 
to live in poverty; Northern Ireland reportedly has the lowest 
discretionary income of any UK region (Asda, 2018). It is 
because of these reasons that some respondents described 
money lending as being like an addiction or dependency:
Because areas are so deprived and there is a lack of work, 
people have become dependent on lending, so it has grown 
and become more of an issue. (Int. 3)
People don’t want to stop because they can’t afford to. Even 
though they come looking for help, they go straight back 
once they are sorted out. I think there is a fear, but it is a fear 
of not having any money. (Int. 4)
A number of groups interviewed suggested that illegal lenders, 
in many regards, were viewed by community members as an 
integral part of some communities and seen to provide a worthy 
and necessary service:
There is a general belief that lenders are providing a good 
service to impoverished community members. (Focus Group)
We need to be very cognisant of the environment in which 
we are operating within – there is a permissive environment 
around these behaviours – an acceptance, a normalisation. 
It is a bit like a bloke offering you a dodgy box for £200 
that gets all the channels for life – people are not going to 
turn it down or see it as breaking the law. (Int. 1)
It was also suggested that members of some communities 
have been utilising the same illegal lending for generations: 
‘grandmothers, mothers, daughters have been going to the 
same lender for years’ (Focus Group). It was evident that 
the durability of these lenders was based upon the personal 
relationships that were established between the lender and 
the borrower ‘on the doorstep’ in working-class communities. 
Anecdotally, respondents suggested that these illegal lenders 
had become so close-knit within communities that they attended 
some of their borrower’s children’s birthday parties and 
weddings. This was often based on the social nature of 
credit and the routine ‘gifting patterns’ that were based 
on reciprocity and trust. For example, it was suggested 
that lenders, during pressure points in the year – such 
as Christmas or the upcoming school year – would offer 
lenders more money as a sign of generosity.
Such findings are supported by other research conducted in 
the area. For example, Ellison et al. (2006) found that up to  
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40% of illegal payments were collected by lenders themselves, 
and involved smaller groups of individuals (and family 
members) relying upon (and exploiting) their social networks 
rather than the more impersonal and hierarchical structure of 
more organised and larger criminal enterprises dealing with 
‘strangers’. However, the respondents from this research did 
caveat these statements, acknowledging that while members of 
the community may have felt this way, it undoubtedly had more 
of a negative impact on community members than they realised:
Because people need these groups, they accept them. 
But from the perspective of others looking in [e.g. NGOs, 
support groups], they don’t like it, they don’t like what they 
are doing to the borrowers. The communities want the 
lenders there because they need them, but the lenders also 
have a hold on them. The lenders do not care about the 
borrowers. The lenders hold on to the borrowers’ bank cards 
and take the money out that they are owed and giving them 
borrowers the change; they know when their benefits are 
coming in, and wait for them at the local Post Office. (Int. 3)
An interesting aspect in this regard was that the threat of 
retribution for non-payment seemed to be regarded as 
a separate entity. In many instances, from the community 
perspective, violent retribution seemed to be an acceptable part 
of the illegal money lending process, but it appeared that it was 
only likely to affect certain borrowers, for example, young men. 
Repercussions for other Borrowers may have centred around 
some degree of shaming:
They are more likely to use certain borrowers as examples 
for not paying; for example, a young man is more likely to 
be a victim of a violent punishment for not paying than a 
mother with three kids. The community would not react well 
to that. For women or the elderly, it is more common that the 
lender would turn up at their place of work, or wait for them 
at the Post Office on the day that their benefits would be 
received, or even take and have control of their Post Office 
cards. (Focus Group)
As noted earlier in this report, the decision on how much 
pressure they could apply to a particular individual in order 
to recoup what they were owed was referred to as part of the 
‘PR’ of being a money lender. In many communities, there was 
a consensus that violent punishment was acceptable for young 
men, but not for other demographics. In a similar vein, the 
lenders may make exceptions for people who were in abject 
poverty. For example:
In one instance, there was a person who was able to prove 
to the lender that all the food in their house was from a food 
bank; and the lender waived their fee. When stories similar 
to this circulate around communities, this reinforces the 
communal support for the illegal lenders. (Focus Group)
Discussions with participants in this regard always led back 
to paramilitarism. It was suggested that while there were 
certain lenders within some communities who did not have any 
affiliation with paramilitaries, the large majority of lenders did 
have some connection.
It is important to note that there is no homogenous 
reason why a person may use an illegal money lender 
as a financial resource. Each individual circumstance 
is culturally, socially and economically distinct. 
However, this research does provide an insight into 
the wider sociocultural and economic context of 
borrowing from illegal money lenders. Other than 
their clients’ obvious lack of access to alternative 
forms of mainstream lending, how illegal money 
lenders operate tends to be based upon trust, ease, 
routine, and personal relationships ‘on the doorstep’ 
in working-class communities.
2.2.3 Offering viable alternatives
As part of the research, respondents were asked to discuss 
viable alternatives to illegal lenders. Many discussed the 
difficulties of finding alternatives for those individuals with poor 
credit ratings and suggested that some social enterprises and 
other imaginative schemes had been relatively successful in the 
past, but that many were short lived:
It is difficult. To make it work, given the level of default, the 
interest rates that a social enterprise would have to charge 
are so high. (Int. 4)
The only solution is to provide some form of lending that is 
cheap, but they will always be accepted for credit – and that 
seems very unlikely in the current environment. (Int. 6)
That being said, some more ‘approachable’ government-
backed ‘Community Development Finance Institutions’ have 
been successful and remain in operation, such as Scotcash 
in Glasgow and Fair for You, which operates in the UK as a 
whole. Scotcash provides ‘affordable credit’, help in setting 
up bank accounts, Credit Union savings accounts and money 
advice for customers. Fair for You is a non-profit organisation 
that provides users with the opportunity to buy essentials for 
their home with ‘affordable’, flexible credit and repayments 
tailored to the buyer’s income.
Many of the respondents interviewed suggested that Credit 
Unions were one of the best alternatives; however, there was 
an apparent reluctance by some members of the community to 
utilise Credit Unions:
Credit Unions are becoming an increasingly popular 
alternative; however, they should continue to reach out to 
other communities to promote responsible borrowing. (Int. 8)
We have seen a growth in community banking, which could 
be an option. The role of Credit Unions is important as well, 
but some communities wouldn’t touch them as they just don’t 
know enough about them. (Int. 6)
However, it was noted that there were restrictions on what 
Credit Unions could offer; indeed, if an individual was not an 
existing member, it was quite difficult to access a large cash sum 
and the need to manage risk of default had ensured that credit 
checks were required for all loans, potentially excluding those 
with poor credit ratings. 
Risk – we try to look at the bigger picture of members but our 
regulators are pushing us to have more certainly in basing 
our decision on the affordability [for] the borrower. So, some 
people will be excluded from lending and may have to 
resort to other means, leading to credit card or illegal debt 
and adding to the problems they have. (Int. 9)
In this regard, the decision on whether a Credit Union could 
lend was increasingly becoming risk dependent. This is a 
problem that is exacerbated in Northern Ireland by the 
existence of higher regulatory restrictions on the interest that 
can be charged, ensuring that Northern Ireland Credit Unions 
are under higher pressure to reduce risk than their counterparts 
in the rest of the UK. It was also recognised that in other 
jurisdictions within the UK, Credit Unions are better supported 
by governments:
The CU try to look at the bigger picture of members, but 
they are regulated and have to base their decision on the 
affordability of the [loan for the] borrower. They cannot lend 
to everybody, some people will be excluded, and as a result 
may resort to other means. (Int. 9)
From a political dimension, Northern Ireland is lagging behind 
the likes of Scotland, where there is a successful programme 
for government on Financial Exclusion. One of the very few 
unanimous motions in the Northern Ireland Assembly was for 
£4 million to support the Credit Unions, but no money was 
actually paid out. (Int. 9)
As has been documented throughout this section, 
some ‘Community Development Finance Institutions’ 
such as the Credit Unions, Scotcash and Fair for You, 
have had consistent success in providing alternative 
financial solutions to borrowers. However, as with 
other issues discussed throughout this report, there 
appears to be a lack of awareness from the borrowers 
of their existence and the benefits they offer. It should 
also be recognised that the role of such institutions is 
vital in terms of providing a viable alternative to those 
accessing illegal money lending.
Government should urgently explore the potential 
to develop viable alternatives to illegal money 
lending, which are accessible in a prompt manner 
without protracted administrative burdens being 
placed on the borrower.
Building on the evidence from this research, this could involve 
establishing a scheme that removes or underwrites some of the 
risk to participating lenders, enabling them to offer less onerous 
loans to a broader range of customers, including those with 
poor credit ratings.
2.2.4 Education and working in 
partnership
Many of the respondents in this research provided support and 
advice to individuals in debt (both legal and illegal). There 
was a shared belief that the principal reasons people were 
getting into debt was a lack of knowledge and understanding 
regarding the alternative sources of finance available to 
them and how to manage money effectively. Many of the 
respondents felt this could be addressed by more financial 
education from a young age: 
Education is imperative, teaching children from a young age 
the value of money, teaching them how to money manage, and 
how damaging lending money illegally can be. (Focus Group) 
Education is crucial – supporting schools/teachers to raise 
financial awareness and build good financial habits. (Int. 9)
Again, this was consistent with findings from the literature 
review. The FCA posited that an unawareness, or lack of 
knowledge, of how to receive loans or credit legally served 
to reinforce the sociocultural pervasiveness of illegal money 
lending:
Many of our partners observed that lack of financial 
education, in tandem with custom and practice in some 
communities, supported continued use of unauthorised 
lenders. For example, borrowers may have grown up in 
places where the unauthorised lender was a familiar part of 
the culture: when they need to get money urgently they know 
where to go (Financial Conduct Authority, 2017, para.3.8).
Some participants felt that The Consumer Council could be 
more involved in delivering education within communities and 
could do more to promote their services. While referencing the 
work done in leading attempts to promote forums for bringing 
stakeholders together to discuss problems around debt and 
problematic lending, many felt that part of the problem in 
this regard was a lack of cohesiveness between all of the 
organisations working within supporting those in debt:
There needs to be more of a focus on educating people at a 
community level. I feel that there needs to be more of a multi-
agency or joined-up approach to promoting The Consumer 
Council within communities. (Int. 10)
Going forward, it must be recognised that there needs 
to be a more joined-up approach to tackling the problem. 
(Focus Group)
In two interviews, respondents also felt that specific 
demographics of people living within Northern Ireland would 
benefit from a more formal education on money management 
and finance. For example, one of the respondents who 
provided support to migrants suggested that upon arriving in a 
new country, migrants often found it difficult and could easily 
find themselves in debt via illegal lenders. This practice could 
transcend generations:
Education and awareness raising should come from within 
the community, but Chinese not interested in doing this thus 
far … it would be good if The Consumer Council could find 
a way to relate more to the Chinese community, but this is 
difficult as their English is poor. Consumer Council could 
carry out a campaign or initiative in the two big Chinese 
supermarkets, which are symbolically important sites for the 
community. The Chinese Christian Church is also a great 
place to try to do this work. (Int. 8)
Of particular note, for some respondents, was NIACRO’s ‘Families 
and Money Matters’ (FAMM) project, which was described as 
an example of good practice for providing specialised debt and 
money management advice to vulnerable citizens. The project 
is funded by the Money Advice Service and provides support to 
people in prison and on probation, and their families. The project 
also works with individuals who are not engaging with mainstream 
debt advice services to identify any potential debt issues and offer 
money management advice and supports prisoners on the build-up 
to their release from prison to help them set up bank accounts and 
sign up to necessary benefits. The project also provides advice 
on finance issues for people entering prison, such as how to deal 
with car finances, mortgages, credit card payments, and monthly 
outgoings. As one respondent explained: 
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The six weeks upon leaving prison is deemed to be a period 
of ‘high risk’. It is the period individuals are most likely to 
accrue a ‘bad debt’. It can be extremely difficult to set up a 
bank account upon release from prison, especially if your 
credit rating isn’t good, and many did not have an account 
before they went into custody. They don’t have proof of ID 
or proof of address. With those legitimate avenues of credit 
closed off, people are more likely to go to payday lenders, 
doorstep lenders or unlicensed money lenders to tide them 
over. To combat this, we try to make people aware of the 
dangers and try to get accounts opened for people in prison 
before they are released. (Int. 13)
The research participants reflected throughout on 
the inherent difficulty in charting the extent of the 
problem, citing its hidden nature caused by fear and 
embarrassment and the cultural and geographic 
inconsistencies in its make-up. Instead of focusing 
too much on formal legislation and legal definitions, 
respondents often preferred to focus on the 
characteristics of illegal lenders, the high or arbitrary 
interest rates charged and the methods used to 
ensure loans were repaid. The findings suggest that 
those involved in illegal money lending fall into two 
broad groups: paramilitaries and ‘regular’ members 
of the community.
However, in practice, it was very difficult to 
accurately characterise the affiliation, legitimacy 
and extent of involvement. It was recognised that 
the money lender has to have some form of local 
influence or legitimacy and this influence tended 
to come from paramilitary groups; however, the 
complex local, geographical and cultural context of 
Northern Ireland ensured that it became increasingly 
difficult to separate the issue of paramilitarism from 
the broader illegal economy.
Given the community-centric and cultural nature of 
illegal money lending within Northern Ireland, and the 
suggestion that it operates within close-knit working-
class communities, many of the respondents felt that it 
was imperative that there was more of an educational 
approach – with a particular focus on children – in 
tackling the issue. Importantly, it was acknowledged 
that there are some examples of good practice, 
notably The Consumer Council-led Stakeholder Forum 
and the work with assisting prisoners; however, these 
projects were often regarded as independent and it 
was strongly believed that the effective resourcing of 
a more ‘joined-up’ approach was necessary to ensure 
that similar services can be allocated to assist a broad 
range of citizens at risk from illegal money lending.
3. Conclusion
This project has explored the nature of illegal money lending and 
problematic debt in Northern Ireland. It is clear that a range of 
agencies have been busy working to identify evidence of this practice 
and assist members of the public in challenging the vulnerabilities 
that can cause it and the symptoms that suggest it is happening. 
A number of issues were identified for further consideration 
and improvement. To begin with, the research identified a 
series of difficulties for law enforcement around resourcing, 
evidence, specialisation and prioritising in response to illegal 
money lending. It was proposed that in continuing to respond 
to these, the PSNI might consider reorganising investigative 
and enforcement measures for tackling illegal lending and 
enhance other measures, including the provision of support 
for victims, educating communities about debt, and working in 
partnership with citizen advocacy groups to support people 
affected by this problem.
Secondly, the research team suggested the need for a more 
formal focus on education and on alternatives, in order to 
provide communities with an insight into the dangers of illegal 
lending and debt accrual, and to provide the knowledge 
and understanding of how to access alternative forms of 
finance. A third recommendation was that more support and 
resourcing should be given to providing viable alternatives 
to illegal money lending for community members, including 
the provision of a government scheme that could remove or 
underwrite some of the risk to legitimate lenders so that they 
are able to offer loans to a broader range of customers, 
including those with poor credit ratings.
Finally, the research team suggested that more resourcing be 
given to support the broadening of a ‘joined-up’ approach to 
ensure that services can be allocated to assist a wide range of 
citizens at risk from illegal money lending.
The evidence from this research therefore suggests that there 
are opportunities for a more formal and rigorous focus on 
the educational aspects of prevention. Such an approach 
would provide communities, and specifically those most 
vulnerable, with a greater insight into the dangers of illegal 
lending and debt accrual, and would enhance knowledge and 
understanding of how to access alternative forms of finance.
In supporting this work, it is recommended that The Consumer 
Council establish an inter-agency ‘Education Forum’ that 
champions and effectively resources a ‘joined-up’ community 
development approach. Building on existing good practice, the 
forum would be led by organisations with the most experience 
of responding to this challenge – including The Consumer 
Council, Christians Against Poverty and Advice NI – but 
would also encourage participants from a broad spectrum 
of organisations, including those from the citizen advocacy, 
community, voluntary, housing, rehabilitation and education 
sectors, to ensure that the widest possible range of citizens at 
risk from illegal money lending are able to access education 
and support.
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